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First Party Bad Faith:
Common Law Remedies
and a Proposed Legislative Solution
By KERRY B. HARVEY* AND THOMAS A. WISEMAN, III**
INTRODUCTION
Until the recent case of Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co.,' the insurance industry in Kentucky was only accountable
to its insureds for the face amount of the insurance contract in
the event of a breach by the insurer. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals broke with tradition in Feathers when it held that an in-
surance company which unjustifiably withholds the proceeds of
an insurance policy may be liable in tort for consequential and
punitive damages.
2
Traditionally, an insured party seeking recovery for the breach
of an insurance contract was limited to damages in the amount
of that contract. The courts of Kentucky, at least until Feathers,
adhered to this view. 3 The limitation in Kentucky is largely ex-
plained by the absence of any reported Kentucky decision that
involved truly egregious conduct by an insurer in settling claims
by its insureds. In contrast, other state courts have confronted cases
in which an aggressive claims adjuster attempted to exact unrea-
sonable concessions from the insured when attempting to settle
*Adjunct Instructor, University of Kentucky College of Law, and University of Louisville
College of Law. B.S., Murray State University, 1978; J.D. University of Kentucky Col-
lege of Law, 1982.
* *B.A., Washington & Lee University, 1979; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law,
1982.
The authors express their appreciation to the administrative staff of Brown, Todd
& Heyburn, and wish to thank Candice F Loop, Amy B. Martin, Cindy Rayner and Pat
Sheets.
1 No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983), reported in 30 KY. L. SuMM.
9, at 8 (Aug. 5, 1983)[hereinafter cited as KLS].
2 Id. at 7-8.
3 See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d
685 (Ky. 1966); Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). See
also text accompanying notes 130-159 tnfra.
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a claim.4In the context of such cases, a trend has developed that
significantly expands the insured's right of recovery against the
insurer. 5 In Feathers, the Kentucky Court of Appeals embraced
that trend and recognized the tort of first party bad faith.
6
The case of Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.
7
illustrates the difficult legal and policy issues inherent in the claims
of first party bad faith. In Sparks, a family contracted with the
defendant insurance company for a health insurance policy. After
discussions with the insurance agent, Mr. Sparks applied for the
policy through his business and sent the first premium payment
with his application.8 The court described what happened next:
Exactly one month after purchasing the insurance, Calvin,
Suzanne and their three children flew to Safford to visit relatives.
On the return flight to Mesa, the small passenger plane m which
they were flying crashed. Cdlvin sustained permanent brain
damage. Kevin, the Sparks' five-year-old son, was rendered a
paraplegic, as well as suffenng a broken jaw and several facial
lacerations. Suzanne and another child received minor inJUries.9
The father's injuries prevented him from maintaimng his air
conditiomng business, and it went bankrupt in December of 1977
The business stopped paying premiums after December, and in
March of the following year the insurance company informed Mrs.
Sparks that the policy was terminated, denying liability for any
medical expenses incurred after December 1, 1977.10 The Court
explained the significant consequences of the termination for the
Sparks family:
4 See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 490 (1982); Cruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973)
See also text accompanying notes 30-39 nfra.
5 Id. See generally Granelli, Good Times for Bad Faith, Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1982
at 1, col. 1.
6 No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 7-8.
7 647 P.2d at 1127.
8 Id. at 1130-31.
9 Id. at 1131.
10 Id. The court stated, "Defendants explained that under the provisons of the
policy, when insurance coverage was terminated, defendants were no longer obligated
to pay for any medical expenses for an injury or illness which occurred while the insurance
was in effect." Id.
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Because of defendant's refusal to pay further medical benefits,
Kevin was forced to forego needed muscle release surgery on his
left thigh. Although the surgery was later performed at the
Arizona Children's Hospital in March 1980, the delay resulted
in deformity to Kevin's left leg, leaving the leg two inches shorter
than the right. Kevin was also unable to obtain braces or crut-
ches due to defendant's refusal to pay benefits. A recent examina-
tion of Kevin revealed that his spine had become badly curved
due to his confinement in a wheel chair. The Sparks' also were
forced to forego additional medical and psychological care for
Calvin. Expert medical testimony established that both Kevin
and Calvin would need continuing treatment throughout their
lives."
The insurance company's refusal to pay in Sparks was pre-
dicated on the insured's failure to maintain premium payments.
12
At the time of purchase, Mr. Sparks examined a brochure explain-
ing the general provisions of the policy. The brochure contained
a specific paragraph providing for termination of benefits once
the insured failed to make premium payments. It also cautioned
the insured to refer to the master policy for more complete details.
Mrs. Sparks testified that she expected coverage for injuries in-
curred while the policy was in force, although she acknowledged
that once the premiums went unpaid, injuries sustained in subse-
quent accidents would not be compensable. The insurer argued
that the provisions of the master policy were controlling and that
it rightfully terminated benefits. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that the trial court properly found that the master policy was am-
biguous in failing to communicate the limitations urged by the
insurer and upheld a directed verdict for the Sparks family 13
The court concluded that an insurance company commits a tort
when it breaches the contract in bad faith, 14 and upheld the jury
verdict against the insurer for $1,551,000 compensatory damages
and $3,000,000 punitive damages.15
1 Id. at 1131-32.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 1135.
14 Id. at 1136.
15 Id. at 1143.
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The facts of the Sparks case present an extreme example of
an insured suffering catastrophic consequences as a result of the
insurer's determination that it was no longer liable under its policy
Insurance companies make such decisions daily, but they rarely
contemplate that the insured will consequently suffer such calamity
as the Sparks family Significantly, the risks of substantial damage
awards inherent in decisions by an insurance company concern-
ing its liability on a policy are directly related to whether the ac-
tion is labelled as one in tort or contract.
A growing number of courts have characterized conduct such
as that of the insurance company in Sparks as a tort, thereby allow-
ing the insured to recover consequential and punitive damages. 16
Conversely, other courts adhere to the traditional view, charac-
terizing the conduct as a breach of contract and limiting damages
to the contract amount. 17 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Feathers adopted the tort theory. 18 The choice of the tort theory,
if ultimately established as law in Kentucky, will require the in-
surance industry in this state to reevaluate its claims settlement
practices.
This Article examines the various alternatives available to a
court when confronted with facts such as those that occurred in
the Sparks case. It uses Sparks as a backdrop for the discussion
because that case illustrates the disastrous consequences which may
occur as a result of an insurer's action that could be deemed to
be reasonable and in good faith. Part I of the Article analyzes and
contrasts the tort and contract theories of recovery in this
context. 19 Part II of the Article next considers Kentucky case law
and examines the potential impact of the Feathers decision on
future Kentucky cases.20 Part III examines the legislative remedy
recently proposed in the Kentucky General Assembly 21 Finally,
Part IV explores an alternative legislative approach that may pro-
vide a better balance of the competing policy considerations.22
16 See notes 30-94 infra and accompanying text.
17 See notes 95-129 infra and accompanying text.
18 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 7.
19 See text accompanying notes 23-129 infra.
20 See text accompanying notes 130-226 nfra.
21 See text accompanying notes 227-282 %ifra.
22 See text accompanying notes 283-285 itjra.
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I. FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH:
TORT v. CONTRACT THEORY
Every insurance contract contains an implied covenant of gbod
faith and fair dealing.23 This implied covenant requires an in-
surance company to deal in good faith with its insured when
evaluating and paying direct, or "first party," claims under the
policy,24 as well as when evaluating, defending, and paying in-
direct, or "third party," claims against the insured by a person
not a party to the insurance contract. 25
23 See Corwin Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d
638, 643 (N.D. 1979) ("an insurer is obligated to act in good faith in its relationship with
its policyholders"); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 911 (Okla. 1982) ("there
is a single duty to deal fairly with the insured and third parties arsing from the relation-
ship established by the contract of insurance"); Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d
313, 319 (R.I. 1980)("an insurer is obligated to act in good faith in its relationship
with its policyholders").
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky discussed this duty in the third party context in
Manchester Ins. & Indem. Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Ky.), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 821 (1975). For a discussion of the Grundy case see Comment, Wrongful Refusal
to Settle: The Implications of Grundy in Kentucky, 65 KY. L.J. 220 (1976-77). In Feathers,
State Farm admitted the existence of this duty in its answer. See Feathers v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983). For a general discus-
sion of this duty, see Harman, An Insurer's Liability for the Tort of Bad Faith, 42 MoNT.
L. REv. 67 (1981).
24 "First party bad faith" occurs when the insured alleges that the insurer has fail-
ed to honor the terms of the contract in its dealings with the insured. In this type of case,
the insured charges that due to an alleged breach by the insurer, the insured is receiving
less from a settlement than he was entitled to receive according to the terms of the con-
tract. The insurer and the insured are the only two parties involved. Feathers is such a
case. Until Feathers, no Kentucky court had recognized "first party bad faith" as a tort.
Such an action was merely a "breach of contract" case and the insurer was liable only
for the amount of the contract. See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp.
v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Ky. 1966).
25 "Third party bad faith," like first party bad faith, contains a claim of injury to
the insured. In this context, however, a third party is intimately involved. This type of
case occurs when the insurer, under the terms of the contract, is defending the insured
against a third party claiming against the insured for some injury covered by the insurance
policy. If, as a compromise, the third party offers a settlement which the insurer refuses
and the case is then litigated with the amount awarded to the third party-exceeding the
limits of the policy, causing the insured to be liable for the difference, the insured may
have a cause of action against the insurer for a bad faith refusal to settle. If bad faith
on the part of the insurer is present, many courts have held that the insurer is guilty of
a tort. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Continental Casualty Co., 647 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.)(apply-
ing Ohio law), cert. dented, 454 U.S. 1053 (1981); Larraburu Bros. v. Royal Indem. Co.,
604 F.2d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 1979)(applying Califorma law); Manchester Ins. & Indem.
1983-84]
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- Sparks6 presents a fairly typical though unusually moving
factual setting for a claim of first party bad faith. The Sparks fami-
ly .contracted with the insurance company for comprehensive
health insurance. Simply put, they were primary parties to an
unexceptional contract. When the insurance company breached
that contract, however, the Sparkses suffered catastrophic conse-
quences. The issue before the courts in these situations is whether
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
is a breach of contract or a tort. The remedies available to an in-
sured depend on the resolution of this issue.
Though admittedly extreme, the Sparks situation is not
unusual. Often, the insured is in a particularly vulnerable posi-
tion at the very time an insurer refuses to pay. By definition, the
insured has felt some loss, possibly of catastrophic proportions,
when the insurance claim is made. A denial of the claim, or even
a lengthy delay, may result in financial and personal calamity for
the insured and his family. On the other hand, insurers, faced with
the possibility of large punitive damage awards if the tort theory
is applied, may well be deterred from defending questionable
claims and asserting valid defenses.
In first party cases, the insurer points loudly and often to its
insurance contract, claiming that even if it is liable, damages must
be limited to the contract amount. In contrast, the insured claims
that the insurer's unreasonableness has caused great and tortious
injury, entitling the plaintiff to receive extracontractual and
punitive damages. The choice of theory, contract or tort, has far-
reaching consequences for insurance companies, insurance con-
sumers (whether claimants or premium payers) and their lawyers.
This complex and multi-faceted problem raises two important,
yet simple, public policy objectives: (1) the law should deter in-
surers from unreasonably delaying or denying benefits due their
insureds under the policy, while providing compensation to in-
sureds suffering damages caused by such misconduct; and (2) the
law should not discourage insurers from asserting valid defenses
Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.), cert. dented, 492 U.S. 821 (1975). See also Com-
ment, supra note 23, at 220.
26 Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 641 P.2d 1127 (Arz. 1982). See text ac-
companying notes 7-15 supra.
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and defending questionable claims. Neither party to the insurance
contract should be aided in extorting a favorable settlement
through threats of delay or bad faith suits. Tension exists between
these two objectives and any solution necessarily involves balanc-
ing one against the other. The question is which theory-tort or
contract-best promotes the realization of these policy goals.
Until very recently, Kentucky courts have analyzed first par-
ty cases under general contract principles, limiting damages to
the amount due under the contract.27 The court of appeals
signaled a radical departure from this established Kentucky rule
in Feathers by recognizing the tort of bad faith in first party cases,
and with it the allowance of consequential and punitive dam-
ages.28 While the rule announced in Feathers may not survive
review due to the peculiar procedural situation in which the case
was decided, 29 Kentu~ky courts will certainly be called upon to
consider the issues raised by the case.
This part of the Article reviews the alternatives available to
the courts and legislature in fashioning an appropriate rule for
first party bad faith cases. It discusses the logical as well as legal
foundation for both tort and contract theories and finds ample
criticism of both.
A. Tort Theory
The 1973 California case of Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance
Co.-° is the landmark decision recognizing a tort for first party
bad faith. The decision has provoked great controversy, both in
California and elsewhere. It is the authority most often cited by
courts adopting the tort of first party bad faith;3' yet it is also the
27 See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d
at 687 ("The traditional measure of recovery for failure to pay money due under contract
is the amount agreed to be paid."); Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d at 164 ("the
measure of recovery for failure to pay money due under.contract is the amount agreed
to be paid").
28 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., slip op. at 8.
29 See note 160 infra.
30 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
31 See, e.g., Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 874, 875-76 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1979) (Jones, J., concumng); Grand Sheet Metal Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins.
Co., 375 A.2d 428, 428-30 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
1983-84]
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case most severely criticized by courts rejecting its rule.32
Therefore, Gruenberg demands careful scrutiny by the Kentucky
courts evaluating the tort theory.
Jerome Gruenberg owned a cocktail lounge known as the Brass
Rail, in Los Angeles, California.- Aetna Insurance Co., along
with two other insurers, carried the fire insurance on Gruenberg's
premises. In the early morning hours of November 9, 1969, the
Brass Rail was destroyed by fire. After Gruenberg arrived at the
scene, he became involved in an argument with an officer of the
arson squad, and was arrested. Aetna retained an independent
adjusting firm to work the Gruenberg loss. The next day, an ad-
juster employed by the firm inspected the premises, and while
there, told an arson investigator that Gruenberg carried excessive
insurance on the building. Later, Gruenberg was formally charged
with arson.34
Aetna demanded that Gruenberg appear for examination
under oath, pursuant to certain provisions of the insurance
policies.5 Gruenberg, heeding advice of counsel, refused to make
any statements while the criminal charges were pending.3 At the
preliminary hearing on the arson charge, the adjuster appeared
as a state's witness and testified that the Brass Rail had been overin-
sured. Nevertheless, that preliminary hearing was concluded with
the dismissal, for lack of probable cause, of all criminal charges
against Gruenberg.37
After the dismissal, Gruenberg contacted Aetna and volun-
teered to give the statement requested by the insurance companies.
The insurers, however, denied liability on the basis of his prior
refusal to appear for the examination.-s Gruenberg then filed
suit, claiming bad faith against the insurer, the insurer's attorneys,
the individual adjuster working the claim and his employer and
32 See, e.g., Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1060-61 (Ala.
1979)(Jones, J., concurring specially); Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 611 P.2d
149, 151-52 (Kan. 1980); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 580
(N.H. 1978); Santilli v. State Farm Life Ins. Co., 562 P.2d 965, 969 (Or. 1977).
-3 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1034.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 1034-35.
37 Id. at 1035.
38 Id.
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the independent adjusting firm. Seelang both compensatory and
punitive damages, Gruenberg alleged that as a "direct and prox-
imate result of the outrageous conduct and bad faith of the defen-
dants," he had suffered severe economic damage, severe emotional
upset and distress, loss of earnings and various other special
damages. 39
Gruenberg charged that the defendants had breached an im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing in its affairs with its in-
sured, and that such conduct was tortious. 40 Significantly, the
Gruenberg court cited third party bad faith cases as authority for
recognizing the same duty in the first party context.41 The court
described the case before it as involving "the duty of an insurer
to act in good faith and fairly in handling the claim of an insured,
namely a duty not to unreasonably withhold payments due under
a policy."' In a crucial and oft-quoted segment, the court
stated:
These are merely two different aspects of the same duty That
responsibility is not the requirement mandated by the terms of
the policy itself-to defend, settle, or pay It is the obligation,
deemed to be imposed by the law, under which the insurer must
act fairly and in good faith in discharging its contractual respon-
sibilities. Where in so doing, it fails to deal fairly and in good
faith with its insured by refusing, without proper cause, to com-
pensate its insured for a loss covered by the policy, such conduct
may give rise to a cause of action in tort for breach of an m-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.43
39 Id.
4 Id. at 1036.
41 Id. The court cited Cnsci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967); Com-
unale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). The Comunale court stated:
"There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract [including
insurance policies] that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the
other to receive the benefits of the agreement." 328 P.2d at 200.
' Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1037.
43 Id. (emphasis in original). As further support, the court cited Richardson v.
Employer's Liab. Assurance Corp., 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972), a case in-
volving umnsured motorist's insurance. In Feathers, the Kentucky Court of Appeals fail-
ed to note that Gruenberg had relied upon a case involving uninsured motorist's insurance.
This fact makes the court's attempt to distinguish Feathers from the controlling authority
untenable. See text accompanying notes 169-178 infra.
1983-84]
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The Gruenberg court determined that the implied duty of good
faith does not arise merely from the terms of the insurance con-
tract; rather it is a duty imposed by law. Because this duty is non-
consensual in origin, the court reasoned that its breach is
tortious. 44 To characterize the insurer's conduct as tortious, the
court was compelled to find an independent duty imposed by the
law, apart from the express or implied terms of the contract.45
The elements necessary before any tort can be found are fundamen-
tal: (1) a duty must be owed by the defendant to the plantiff;
(2) the defendant must breach the duty; (3) the plaintiff must suffer
damages; and (4) the damages must be caused, in fact and prox-
imately, by the breach of the duty.46 The difficulty faced by the
Gruenberg court, and courts adopting its rationale, is in finding
a duty that exists independently of the contract between the in-
surer and its first party insured.47
Obviously, an insurer owes its insured a myriad of duties, and
these responsibilities are specifically enumerated in the insurance
contract. Chief among these is the duty to pay on certain condi-
tions. Generally, however, breach of a contractual duty does not
constitute a tort.48 If the defendant insurer's conduct does not
violate any independent duty to act in a certain way, but is only
a failure to perform an obligation under the insurance contract,
then damages should be limited to those recoverable in con-
44 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1037. The court further stated:
The duty violated-that of dealing fairly and in good faith with the other
party to a contract of insurance-is a duty imposed by law, not one arising
from the terms of the contract itself. In other words, this duty of dealing
fairly and in good faith is nonconsensual in origin rather than consensual.
Breach of this duty is a tort
510 P.2d at 1037 (citations omitted) (quoting Richardson v. Employer's Liab. Assurance
Corp., 102 Cal. Rptr. at 552). The Gruenberg court overruled specific language in Richard-
son requiring that emotional stress must be severe in order for the insured to recover for
it. Id. at 1042 n.10.
45 See 510 P.2d at 1037.
4 6
W PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRs 143 (4th ed. 1971).
47 Courts adopting Cruenberg do recognize that a plaintiff must show that the defen-
dant violated a duty arising independently of the contract in order to make out a cause
of action in tort. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 540 P.2d 1070,
1071 (Nev. 1975) ("The duty violated [to deal fairly and in good faith] arises not from the
terms of the insurance contract but is a duty imposed by law, the violation of which is
a tort."). See also note 69 infra.48D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 818-21 (1973).
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tract.49 Normally, punitive damages and damages for emotional
distress are unavailable in actions for breach of contract.w
Gruenberg found an independent duty based upon the con-
tractual relationship between the insurer and the insured, 51 cor-
rectly noting that an insurer is required to act in the insured's in-
terest in handling claims against the insured (a third party
situation).5 The California court short-circuited the independent
duty analysis, however, by proclaiming that the good faith duty
in the first party context is merely "another aspect" of the same
duty involved in third party cases.53 Analysis of this duty in the
third party context reveals that the Gruenberg reasoning is flawed.
In the typical third party case, a claim is made against the
insured, and the insurance company acts as the attorney-in-fact,
responsible for defending the claim.5 By the terms of the con-
tract, the insurer has the right to control the defense completely,
even though the insured is the defendant. Although the initial rela-
tionship between the insurer and insured is created by the con-
tract, the duty of good faith arises without respect to any
agreement.rs The duty is imposed by law on all agency relation-
49See Harman, supra note 23, at 69 ("It is the violation of the implied covenant of
good faith which gives rise to the tort of 'bad faith' and subjects the insurer to liability
beyond that for breach of contract." (emphasis added)).
50 See, e.g., McNutt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 369 F Supp. 381, 385-86
(W.D. Ky. 1973); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Fyffe, 471 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Ky.
1971). See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 798-821.
51 See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1040 ("Defendant's duty arises
from a contractual relationship existing between the parties.").
52 See id. at 1037.
53 See td.
4See, e.g., National Farmers Umon Property & Casualty Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d
60, 66 (9th Cir. 1964)("[The insurer] was required by the terms of the policy to defend
the action and look after [the insured's] interests as well as its own."); Fowler v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 454 P.2d 76, 76 (Mont. 1969) ("Under the policy [the insurer]
was obligated 'to defend any suit against the insured.' ").
5See e.g., Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015, 1018-19 (Or.
1978). The court stated:
In an action for failure to settle within the policy limits, the insurance com-
pany is charged with acting in a fiduciary capacity as an attorney in fact
representing the nisured's interest in litigation. The company's interest comes
into conflict with that of the insured's while representing him; and, arguably,
acting in its own interests to the detriment of the insured's interest while
acting in such a fiduciary capacity is a tort.
Id. at 1019. See also City of Wakefield v. Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W 643, 644 (Mich.
FRST PARTY BAD FAITH1983-84]
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ships of a similar kind, regardless of whether the relationship is
created by an insurance contract.5' The fact that the insurance
company contracts for the exclusive right to act on behalf of the
insured creates the duty, rather than the contract itself. The same
fiduciary duty is imposed on an attorney the insurance carrier
might hire to represent the insured in the third party litigation,
even though the attorney is not a party to the insurance con-
tract. 57 In essence, the third party duty referred to in Gruen-
berg is simply an adjunct of a basic rule of agency: where an agent
undertakes to act for its principal, it must do so as a fiduciary.ea
The first party context is strikingly different. In first party
cases, the insurer has neither the right nor the duty to act as an
agent for the insured. The insured is at all times in control of his
own fate, without danger of being bound by a disloyal agent to
an unfavorable result. Thus, the agency relationship which creates
the independent duty prerequisite for tort liability does not exist.
The Oregon Supreme Court recogmzed this distinction in Santilli
v. State Farm Life Insurance Co. :59
In cases involving the insurer's duty to pay under policies for
theft, fire, health, disability or life insurance [first party cases],
the unique relationship which gives rise to the special duty of
liability insurers to attempt to settle within their policy limits
does not arise. The insured, or his beneficiary, is not subject to
the imposition of excess liability, and his rights and respon-
sibilities are limited to those set forth in his contract. 60
The Gruenberg rationale is incorrect, then, because an essential
element of any tort is missing, namely, an independent duty run-
1929)("Prohibition against fraud or bad faith is inposed by law upon every legal rela-
tionship and it is not necessary to contract for it."(emphasis added)).
56 3 Am. JUR. 2D Agency § 199 (1962) ("the agent is bound to the exercise of
the utmost good faith toward [its] principal").
57 See, e.g., In re Gilbert, 118 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1938). The Court stated, "Good
faith and fair dealing are expected of a lawyer in his contacts with his adversaries. They
are essential elements in his contacts with his clients." Id. The attorney owes this duty
of good faith and fair dealing to the insured, even though he is compensated by the insurer.
8 3 Am. Jur 2D Agency § 199. "An agent is a fiduciary with respect to the matters
within the scope of his agency." Id. See generally Sir v. Edenborn, 242 U.S. 131 (1916);
Shatz Realty Co. v. King, 10 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1928).
59 562 P.2d at 965.
60 Id. at 968-69.
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ning from defendant to plaintiff. The courts have had difficulty
discerning the distinction between the elements of tort and con-
tract in this confusing area; nevertheless, it is a fundamental
distinction that must be made.
The shaidness of the reasomng of the Gruenberg court is
betrayed by its treatment of the claims against the non-insurer
defendants. Mr. Gruenberg named the insurance adjusters and
lawyers employed by Aetna as defendants and charged them with
committing the very acts that resulted in Aetna's tort liability.6
The court dismissed these defendants, stating that "the non-insurer
defendants were not parties to the agreements for insurance;
therefore, they are not, as such, subject to an implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. " 62 The court, however, had already found
an independent duty on the part of the insurance company. If the
duty is truly independent, then it is irrelevant whether the in-
dividuals were parties to the contract or not. Nevertheless, the court
absolved the individual defendants of liability because they were
not parties to the insurance contracts with the plaintiff.6
3
Another California case, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co.,1 further illustrates the flaws in the tort analysis. In Egan,
the plaintiff relied on Gruenberg as the basis for his suit for com-
pensatory and punitive damages arising from a claim under a
disability insurance policy.3 A jury verdict was entered against
the insurance carrier for $45,600 in general damages, $78,000 for
emotional distress, and $5,000,000 in punitive damages.6 Al-
though the punitive damage award was reversed, 67 the size of the
61 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1035.
62 Id. at 1039. (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 1038-39. The Court stated:
However, plaintiff contends that these non-insurer defendants breached only
the duty of good faith and fair dealing; therefore, we need not consider the
possibility that they may have committed another tort in their respective
capacities as total strangers to the contracts of insurance. Obviously, the non-
insurer defendants were not parties to the agreements for insurance; therefore,
they are not, as such, subject to an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Id.
6' 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979).
65 Id. at 141.
66Id. at 144.
67 Id. at 149. The court held that the punitive damage award was the result of pas-
sion and prejudice on the part of the jury. Id.
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award emphasizes the problems confronting insurers in taking their
case before a jury. Egan adopted the Gruenberg rationale and held
the insurer liable in tort for failure to investigate the insured's
claim.68 The court correctly noted that every contract contains
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with other par-
ties to the contract."' Of course, this implied duty arises in every
contract, not just insurance policies. In adopting Gruenberg, the
Egan court observed: "[T]he precise nature and extent of the du-
ty imposed by such an implied promise will depend on the con-
tractual purposes." 70 Yet if, as Egan suggests, the duty is impos-
ed by virtue of an implied promise, then it certainly does not arise
independent of the contract. Further, if the "nature and extent
of the duty" depends on the contractual purpose, then once again,
it cannot be independent, and instead finds life only in the
agreement.
The Egan court failed to distinguish the separate concepts of
tort and contract when it considered the plaintiff's claim for
damages. The court stated:
As insurers are well aware, the major motivation for obtaimng
disability insurance is to provide funds during periods when the
ordinary source of the insured's income-his earnings-has stop-
ped. The purchase of such insurance provides peace of mind and
security in the event the insured is unable to work.
71
This statement makes a persuasive argument that extra-contractual
damages are foreseeable, and therefore recoverable under the rule
of Hadley v. Baxendale.72 Yet this foreseeability analysis really
68 Id. at 145.
69 Id. This implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is found in every contract.
See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. § 355.1-203 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter cited as KES] which
states, "Every contract or duty within this chapter imposes an obligation of good faith
in its performance or enforcement."
70 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d at 145 (emphasis added).
71 Id.
72 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). For discussion of the Hadley v. Baxendale rule, see
text accompanying notes 97-128 & 202-22 infra. Although separating actions m tort from
actions in contract is often difficult, it is essential for determimng the available remedies.
Chief Justice Struckmeyer of the Arizona Supreme Court made this point in his dissenting
opinion in Noble v. National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866. Responding to the majon-
ty opinion that adopted the Gruenberg rationale, he stated in dissent:
The existence of a duty to the plaintiff is a prerequisite to tort liability. But
the duty, the breach of which gives rise to a tort claim, must be a general
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relates only to damages arising from a breach of contract, and
is out of context when discussing tort damages. 73
Finally, the Egan court, when dealing with the non-insurer
defendants, fell into the same trap of internal inconsistency as
Gruenberg. The plaintiff in Egan also sued two individuals ac-
ting as the insurer's agents. The court rejected the claim against
these defendants for the very same conduct which resulted in
liability of the insurance company, stating that "they are not parties
to the insurance contract and not subject to the implied cov-
enant." 74 The court ignored the fact that if the duty is truly inde-
pendent, then it is irrelevant whether the defendant is a party to
the contract. If the duty is absolute and independent of any con-
tract, then it must also be imposed on an insurer's agents, as well
as the company itself.
Certainly, such independent duties exist, and their breach can
amount to tortious conduct, even though a contract may be at
the heart of a dispute. An example that may be relevant to in-
surance law is the duty to refrain from the intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 75 An insured might suffer a loss covered by
an insurance policy, and report it to the carrier's claim service.
Intentional and outrageous conduct by the claim service represen-
tatives toward the insured could result in tort liability for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress in a state recognizing that
tort.76 While the" insurance contract in such a situation initially
duty imposed by law apart from a contract rather than a contractual duty
imposed by consent. If the duty is private, created by the terms of a
contract, no remedy in tort is available for its breach.
Id. at 868 (Struckmeyer, C.J., dissenting)(quoting Phoemx Professional Hockey Club, Inc.
v. Hirmer, 502 P.2d 164, 165 (1972)).
73 See W PROsSEn, supra note 46, § 92 at 619-20 ("In the tort action, the only limita-
tions are those of 'proximate cause,' whereas Hadley v. Baxendale limits breach of con-
tract damages to those foreseeable.").
74 620 P.2d at 149.
75 See Craft v. Rice, 30 KLS 6, at 2 (May 12, 1983); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TonTs § 46(1) (1965). See generally W PROSSER, supra note 46, at 49-62.
76 See Green v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 667 F.2d 22, 23-24 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Ninth Circuit, applying Oregon law, affirmed the lower court's award of general
and punitive damages against an insurance company for its conduct in dealing with the
plaintiffs after they had filed a claim for a fire loss. The court held that the insurance
adjuster's actions (which included posing as a state policeman when interviewing the plain-
tiffs neighbors, and threatening to charge the plaintiff with arson if the plaintiff pressed
his claim) constituted the tort of outrageous conduct.
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created the relationship, the duty to refrain from causing emo-
tional distress is an independent duty imposed on everyone, without
respect to the contract.
The courts have failed to enumerate precisely the elements of
the tort of bad faith. A Wisconsin court, in Anderson v. Continen-
tal Insurance Co.,77 has given extensive, although ultimately un-
satisfactory, consideration to this problem. According to the test
developed in Anderson, "a plaintiff must show the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying benefits of the policy, and the defen-
dant's knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of reasonable
basis for denying the claim."78 The court held that the breach of
an insurance contract can amount to an intentional tort,79 yet
undercut that holding when it stated:
[I]mplicit in that test is our conclusion that the knowledge of
a lack of a reasonable basis may be inferred and imputed to an
insurance company when there is a reckless disregard of a lack
of a reasonable basis for denial or a reckless indifference to facts
or to proofs submitted by the insured.s°
Thus, "reckless disregard" is also sufficient to trigger liability.
Finally, the standard of culpability is submerged in even greater
uncertainty by the frequent references to "objective standard"'"
and "reasonable basis,"82 terms usually associated with a negli-
gence standard. The California court in Egan also adopted a for-
mula similar to a negligence standard,83 its language to the con-
trary notwithstanding. s Therefore, if a court adopting this the-
17 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978).
78 Id. at 376.
79Id.
80 Id. at 377.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Under the Egan standard, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is
said to exist between insurer and insured. This implied promise imposes upon the insurer
a duty not to interfere with the insured party's right to receive the benefit of the agree-
ment. If the insurer unreasonably withholds payment, or otherwise fails to protect the
insured party's interest, a breach of this duty may have occurred and the insurer may be
liable in tort. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d at 145.
84 The court in Egan spoke in contractual terms, referring to a "covenant of good
faith and fair dealing." Id. The court also noted that there was evidence "that defendant
acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress, and in conscious disregard of the rights of
its insured." Id. at 147.
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ory finds that an insurer withholds payment "unreasonably or in
bad faith," or fails to exercise ordinary care in investigating plain-
tiff's claim, then, apparently the insurer will be held liable in
tort.s5 The more skeptical critics of this reasoning have lamented
that it imposes strict liability on first party insurers.86
The adoption of the tort theory raises the question of its ap-
plication to other contracts involving business relationships. A re-
cent Montana case has expanded the tort theory to recogmze a
cause of action in tort for breach of an employment contract. In
Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co.,87 the Montana Supreme
Court determined: "[A]n employer's breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, which is implicit in the at-will employment
contract, gives rise to a tort rather than a contract action, and
thus punitive damages may be recovered."ss The court indicated
that while the duty which was breached arose out of the employ-
ment relation, it existed apart from, and in addition to, any terms
agreed to by the parties.89 The court reasoned that this duty is
very similar to the duty to act in good faith in discharging con-
tractual insurance obligations, and concluded that since the duty
is imposed by operation of law, its breach should find a remedy
in tort.9
The prospect of such boundless expansion has significant
ramifications in all areas of business. A principal element of con-
tract law has been the economic efficiency inherent in the posses-
sion of the option to breach. 91 In some instances, breaching a
contract and paying contractual damages makes economic sense
if performing the contract will cause substantial losses. If tort
5 See id.
86 See Neal v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 999 (Cal. 1978)(Clark, J.,
dissenting).
87 52 U.S.L.W 1031 (Mont. Aug. 5, 1983). See also Graneli, Good Timesfor Bad
Faith, NATL L.J., July 11, 1982 at 1, col. 1. Another case which seeks tort remedies for
a breach of a business contract, Seamen's Direct Buying Servsce, Inc. v. Standard Oil of
California, is currently pending in Califorma. Id.
88 52 U.S.L.W at 1031.
89 Id.
9 Id.
91 D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 786 n. 1. See also Birmingham, Breach of Contract,
Damages Measures and Economi Efficiency, 24 RuT. L. REv. 273 (1969-70).
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recovery displaces contract remedies, however, such methods of
conducting business will have to be reconsidered.
Despite the conceptual and logical fallacies of the tort theory,
it does provide the emotionally appealing result of allowing the
insured to recover fully for all conceivable yet ascertainable
damages suffered as a result of the insurer's misconduct.92 Fur-
ther, the tort theory allows the jury to punish the insurer for
reprehensible conduct, presumably deterring others from engag-
ing in similar conduct. 93 While the policy objective of fully com-
pensating the wronged insured is served by the tort theory, the
equally important objective of avoiding disincentives to insurers
that discourage them from contesting questionable claims is con-
comitantly sacrificed.94 The question remains, then, whether
each policy objective may be promoted by utilizing a different
theory of recovery.
B. Contract Theory
The Arizona Supreme Court applied the tort theory in Sparks
with the result that the plaintiffs were allowed both consequen-
tial and punitive damages. 95 If the court had applied the con-
tract theory, the Sparkses would not have received punitive dam-
ages, and might not have recovered any consequential dam-
ages. 96 Thus, for example, Kevin Sparks would not have receiv-
ed compensation for the subsequent physical impairment he sus-
tained because of the lack of funds necessary to obtain medical
care. Instead, the Sparkses' recovery would have been limited to
that amount due under the terms of the insurance contract: insur-
able expenses for all medical care necessitated by an occurrence
during the life of the policy.
92 See Neal v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d at 985. The court allowed compensatory
damages for legal fees incurred in pre-trial arbitration and the finance charges for a se-
cond mortgage on the plaintiffs home. Id.
93 See id. at 991.
94 See id. at 999 (Clark, J., dissenting).
95 See Sparks v. Republic Natl Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d at 1132. See also text accom-
panying notes 7-15 supra.
96 See ut. But see D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 207 & nn.14-17 ("But it is an
overgeneralization to say contract breach never justifies punitive awards." In such cases,
courts usually say that defendant has committed a tort as well as a breach, having violated
a duty imposed by law).
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The basic goal of contract damages is to put the aggrieved party
in the position he would have been in had the contract been
performed. 97 This is based on the theory that the non-breaching
party should be given the benefit of his bargain. The general
measure of damages for breach of an insurance contract is usual-
ly the amount of the contract itself, or the extent of insurable
damage, whichever is less.98 In addition to these general
damages, a party may also recover special or consequential
damages in a proper case.99 Several significant obstacles must be
overcome before these damages may be awarded. The damages
must have been caused by the breach. 1' 9 The amount of damages
must be shown with some accuracy. °10 Finally, the plaintiff must
prove that such damages were contemplated by the parties at the
time of the contract. 02 These requirements increase substantial-
ly the difficulty of recovering consequential damages in a contract
action.
The latter element, whether the damages were in the con-
templation of the parties, is typically defined in terms of "fqre-
seeability."'03 The standard for this element was first articulated
in the classic case of Hadley v. Baxendale:1
4
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has
broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., ac-
cording to the usual course of things, from such breach of con-
tract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been
in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the
special circumstances under which the contract was actually
made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants,
97 See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 786.
98 See, e.g., 53 S.W.2d at 969.




103 What is "foreseeable" in a contract case differs from what is "foreseeable" in a
tort case. The former classification is more narrow. See D. DOBBS, supra note 48, at 804
& n.24.
14 156 Eng. Rep. at 145.
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and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the
breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably con-
template, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily
follow from a breach of contract under these special cir-
cumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other
hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to
the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be
supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury
which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases
not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach
of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the
parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract
by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of this ad-
vantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. 0
The crucial inquiry is whether this standard precludes consequen-
tial damages in breach of insurance contract cases.
The Michigan Supreme Court provided a full discussion of each
side of this issue in Kewin v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance
Co6 which arose from the nonpayment of benefits allegedly due
under a disability insurance policy.107 The court dismissed any
contention that the insurer's conduct constituted a tort.08 In-
stead, it considered whether, and under what circumstances, men-
tal distress and exemplary damages should be recoverable as a con-
sequence of the breach of an insurance contract., Application
of Hadley v. Baxendale and its progeny provided the answer.
The court noted that the general rule excluded mental distress
damages in contract actions and limited damages to the monetary
value of the contract." 0 The court described insurance contracts
for disability income protection as essentially agreements to pay
money upon the occurrence of a specified event;"' thus, they are
105 Id. at 151.
106 295 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1980).
107 Id. at 51.
108 Id. at 56.
109 Id. at 52. The court stated, "Just as with [the rationale] denying damages for
mental distress, the theory underlying the demal of exemplary damages m breach of con-
tract cases is that the plaintiff is adequately compensated when damages are awarded by
reference only to the terms of the contract." Id. at 55.
1l0 Id. at 53.
"I Id.
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commercial in nature and mental distress arising from a breach
was not contemplated or foreseeable.
The Kewin majority considered an exception to the general
rule recognized in Stewart v. Rudner.12 In Stewart the plaintiff
sued a doctor for breach of a contract to deliver the plaintiff's child
by Caesarean section. The plaintiff alleged that the breach of the
contract caused her child to be stillborn, and she sought damages
for the resulting emotional distress."1 The Michigan Supreme
Court framed an exception allowing damages for mental distress
when a contract is breached:
When we have a contract concerned not with trade and com-
merce but with life and death, not with profit but with elements
of personality, not with pecuniary aggrandizement but with mat-
ters of mental concern and solicitude, then a breach of duty with
respect to such contracts will inevitably and necessarily result
in mental anguish, pain and suffering. In such cases, the parties
may reasonably be said to have contracted with reference to the
payment of damages therefore in event of breach. Far from be-
ing outside the contemplation of the parties they are an integral
and inseparable part of it."
4
This commercial/personal distinction articulated in Stewart is
merely an application of the generally accepted foreseeability
analysis." 5 The inquiry, focuses on the characterization of the
contract: whether it is primarily personal or primarily commer-
cial.116 This distinction is simply a method of expressing a conclu-
sion as to whether emotional distress was a foreseeable result of
the contract breach. It simply reflects the conclusion of the Hadley
v. Baxendale analysis. A majority of the court in Kewin held that
a disability insurance policy was commercial in nature, and mental
anguish damages were therefore barred as too remote." 7 Addi-
tionally, because the suit was for breach of contract, the court
112 84 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 1957).
13 Id. at 821.
"14 Id. at 824.
n1 See text accompanying notes 97-105 supra.
116 See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d at 53. See also 295
N.W.2d at 57 (Williams, J., concuming in part and dissenting in part).
117 See 295 N.W.2d at 53-55.
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did not allow punitive or exemplary damges." 8 This holding is
representative of the analysis accorded in first party cases by courts
adhering to the traditional contract theory.
One justice stated in a separate opinion that the court should
have allowed emotional distress as consequential damages in
Kewin."9 Justice Williams noted several examples of contracts
which were deemed to be "personal": "[Clontracts to marry, con-
tracts between carriers and passengers, contracts of innkeepers and
guests, contracts for the disposition of dead bodies, contracts for
the delivery of death messages, contracts for public entertain-
ment or amusement, and contracts to provide care, room, and
board." 120 Justice Williams concluded that disability insurance
contracts are personal in nature, and therefore mental anguish
was a proper item of recovery upon breach. 2 1 After citing
several cases in which various types of first party insurance con-
tracts are labelled as personal, Justice Williams determined that
contracts for disability insurance are personal in nature because
the insurer is selling and the insured is buying peace of mind."2
He stated: "[I]t is elemental that an insured is basically contrac-
ting for both financial and emotional security in the event of
loss." ' -' The Justice presumed that disability insurers contemplate
118 Id. at 55.
119 295 N.W.2d at 57 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120 Id. at 62 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)(citations omit-
ted). Justice Williams quoted from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 367 com-
ment a (Tentative Draft No. 14, 1979):
In the second exceptional situation [to the general rule that recovery for emo-
tional disturbance is not available in breach of contract actions], the con-
tract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was
a particularly likely result. Common examples are contracts of carriers and
innkeepers with passengers and guests, contracts for the carnage or proper
disposition of dead bodies, and contracts for the delivery of messages con-
cerning death. Breach of such a contract is particularly likely to cause serious
emotional disturbance. Breach of other types of contracts, resulting for ex-
ample in sudden impovershment or bankruptcy, may by chance cause even
more severe emotional disturbance, but, if the contract ts not one where this
was a particularly likely risk, there is no recovery for such disturbance.
Id. at 61-62 n.6 (emphasis in onginal)(This language was adopted in the final version of
the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 comment a (1979)).
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emotional distress as a consequence of breach at the time a policy
is issued.' 1 Under this theory, once a breach of the insurance
contract has been established, and the contract is characterized
as personal, damages for mental anguish will flow if there is proof
of the.distress. 25 Given the nature of insurance, this view is not
unreasonable since the assumption that people desire to procure
peace of mind by purchasing insurance seems to be accurate.
Significantly, the quality of the breach is not relevant under
this reasoning. In other words, distinctions of good faith and bad
faith have no meaning since the emotional distress and other con-
sequential damages are merely contract damages. Contract law,
being amoral,12 does not inquire into the defendant's state of
mind at the time of the breach. An umntentional breach of con-
tract causes the same damages as an intentional or bad faith
breach.' 27 While punitive damages are unavailable under this
theory, a wide array of consequential damages could be award-
ed. The consequential damages would not be limited to emotional
distress; indeed, emotional distress might be among the more dif-
ficult consequential damages to prove.'12 If a credit life insurer
were to breach its contract, however, the insured might well claim
and recover damages from an ensuing foreclosure. Liability would
be predicated on a determination that such damages were rea-
sonably foreseeable or, at the time of the contract, in the contem-
plation of the parties. The breach of a health insurance contract,
as in Sparks, may result in foreseeable consequences such as medical
complications arising from the lack of funds for necessary
treatment.12 Thus, the contract theory, applied in the manner




126 Cf. Birmingham, supra note 90, at 292 ("protection of the [aggrieved party's]
expectation interest is [adequately] dictated by considerations of economic efficiency
[without the necessity of considering morality]").
127 See 295 N.W.2d at 55.
128 See J.A. STEIN, DAMACES AND RECOVERY, at § 31 (1972)(observing the "difficulty
of assessing the proof [because it] is largely in the exclusive control of the plaintiff").
129 See Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d at 1131-32.
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II. KENTUCKY CASE LAW
First party bad faith is becoming a fertile area for litigation
in jurisdictions throughout the country. Although the tort theory
is gaining widespread acceptance, 130 many courts nonetheless
continue to adhere to the traditional contract analysis when con-
fronted with a first party bad faith claim by an insured.131 Prior
to Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 32 the Kentucky
courts seemed firmly settled in the contract camp. The Sparkses
would probably have been limited to recovery solely under the
terms of the contract under traditional Kentucky law. If Feathers
becomes the established law of the jurisdiction, however, the
Sparkses of Kentucky may seek virtually unlimited damages.
A. Pre-Feathers Case Law
Until Feathers, Kentucky courts uniformly held that damages
for breach of a first party insurance policy were limited to the
amount due under the contract.lss This limitation was ac-
complished under the familiar rubric of contract law Clark v.
Life and Casualty Insurance Co.134 provides a good example of
the application of this rule and illustrates its longevity. In Clark,
the plaintiff had procured a life insurance policy for his wife. Upon
her death, the insurer refused to pay $162, the amount due under
the policy, claiming that no premiums had been paid. The plain-
tiff alleged that he had purchased the policy to defray the expenses
of his wife's burial, and that, after learning of the insurer's refusal
to pay, the undertaker refused to extend credit.lss As a result,
plaintiff claimed that he "was compelled to beg and borrow from
friends and acquaintances whatever amounts he could in order
to produce the required fund to properly bury his wife, and that
130 See notes 4-5 supra for cases accepting the tort theory.
131 See note 3 supra for cases accepting the contract analysis.
132 No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983).
13 See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d
685, 687 (Ky. 1966); Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d 968, 969 (Ky. 1932);
Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d 162, 164-65 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
134 53 S.W.2d at 968.
135 Id. at 969.
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he was thereby caused great humiliation and suffering, both men-
tally and physically," and he sought $5,000 in damages.' Clark
presents the classic first party situation in which the insured,
presenting very sympathetic facts, claims that the insurer's
unreasonable acts have caused damages far in excess of the amount
provided for in the insurance contract. These apparently unan-
ticipated damages in Clark are analagous to those in Sparks.137
In Clark, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky treated the in-
surance policy as merely a commercial contract, 13 noting: "[T]he
measure of recovery for the failure to pay money [on a life in-
surance policy] is the amount agreed to be paid with legal
interest."'139 Utilizing this general measure of damages, the Court
rejected plaintiffs claim for damages for mental distress. 140
Although decided in 1932, the Clark approach has been the begin-
ning and end of the analysis for Kentucky courts until Feathers.
After labeling a case as one in contract, the courts have simply
applied the general measure of damages and rather mechanically
disallowed consequential damages. 14x
136 Id.
137 Id.. The Court noted in its preliminary discussion: "There are many classes of
cases where consequential damages may be recovered for the violation of a contract, when
such recovery may be considered as fairly within the contemplation of the parties as prox-
imately flowing from the breach." Id. This passage merely restates the Hadley v. Baxen-
dale rule limiting recovery of consequential damages for breach of contract. See note 105
supra and accompanying text.
13 53 S.W.2d at 969.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 970. The Court did not reach the question whether the carner's failure
to pay was justified. Once the claim for consequential damages was eliminated, the amount
in controversy fell below the Court's jurisdictional requirement, and the case was dismissed
on that ground. Id.
141 See, e.g., General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd, 400 S.W.2d
at 685. But see Motors Insurance Corp. v. Jackson, 340 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1960). In Jackson,
the Court of Appeals intimated that a more thorough analysis might be n order. The plain-
tiff had purchased a truck for use in his business. The truck was damaged in an accident,
and, after investigation, the insurer notified the plaintiff that it considered the policy cancell-
ed ab initio, citing alleged false representations made by the insured. The complaint alleged
that the cancellation was wrongful, and resulted in the repossession of the vehicle. The
plaintiff sought damages for the loss of the use of the truck and lost profits resulting from
the repossession. Curiously, the Court labelled the case as "[a]n action on a contract sounding
in tort." Id. at 611. The Court did not expand on this characterization since it found the
evidence of consequential damages too indefinite to support the claim. Id. at 612.
While Jackson seemed to leave the door open for a hybrid action merging tort and
contract, Judd rejected any notion that such an action could be maintained. Recognizing
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General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Judd'4 is
a more recent example of this line of reasoning in Kentucky. Judd
concerned a claim by an automobile owner under the collision
coverage of her automobile insurance policy. After the insured
automobile was badly damaged in an accident, the insured and
the carrier could not agree on an estimate of the cost necessary
to repair the car. The insured sued, demanding not only recovery
for the reduction in value caused by the damage, but also storage
costs and damages for lost use of the automobile. In an argument
that presaged Feathers, plaintiff claimed that her action
"sound[ed]" in both tort and contract. 43 Thus, only the amount
due under the policy was recoverable. The Court, however,
characterized the suit as nothing more than one for breach of a
contract to pay money 44 Citing Clark, the Court noted that the
traditional measure of damages for a breach of such a contract
is the amount due under the policy, 145 and concluded with a
reminder that punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of
contract.
The more recent case of Deaton v. Allstate Insurance Co.1
46
acknowledged the continued validity of this rule. Because Deaton
was decided after other jurisdictions1 47 had begun to adopt the
tort theory in cases of first party bad faith, the issues are more
sharply focused. Deaton involved an automobile accident in which
one of the plaintiffs' children was killed, and the other seriously
injured14 The plaintiffs asserted a claim against the insurance
company under their uninsured motorist coverage. They stated
their action in tort, claiming that the insurer was guilty of bad
faith in failing to pay promptly under the policy, and that the
bad faith constituted a tort. Citing Judd, the court characterized
the uncertainty created by Jackson, the Judd Court construed Jackson to be in accord with
the general rule, thereby foreclosing recovery beyond the contract amount. See General
Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v Judd, 400 S.W.2d at 687-88.
142 400 S.W.2d at 685.
'43 Id. at 687.
144 Id.
145 Id. The Court concluded with a reminder that punitive damages are not allow-
ed for a breach of contract. Id. at 688.
146 548 S.W.2d 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
147 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. -Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032 (Cal. 1973).
148 548 S.W.2d at 163.
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the case as a simple breach of contract action. 49 The court then
applied the general measure of damages, limiting recovery to the
amount due according to the terms of the contract.'-' The court
clearly indicated that it considered first party cases to give rise
to a breach of contract action only, and, significantly, left little
doubt that it considered a claim under an uninsured motorist policy
as a first party action.' 5'
Before evaluating the traditional Kentucky rule, the factual
contexts in which these first party cases have arisen should be
noted. In particular, Judd and Deaton contained no evidence of
any egregious behavior on the part of the insurer.12 Further-
more, the kind of tragic circumstances which are compounded
by the termination of coverage, as so poignantly illustrated by
Sparks,1m cannot be found in the reported decisions of Kentucky
The failure of these two factors to appear in concert is the most
compelling explanation of the longevity of the strict Kentucky rule.
A mechanical application of this traditional rule has several
advantages. Awards are limited to the maximum amount stated
by the contract, with the apparent consequences that insurance
underwriting will be more accurate. 15 Obviously, recoveries will
generally be lower, and, theoretically at least, the savings are pass-
ed on to consumers.'-, In addition, insurance carriers are en-
couraged to defend questionable cases and to raise all valid
defenses, without fear of excessive jury verdicts. Again, lower
premiums should be the result. The traditional rule also has the
149 Id. at 164. The court stated: "A first party claim [as in the present case] gives
rise to a contract action. Although appellants allege that this is a tort action, this
court is of the opinion that this is a breach of contract action." Id.
ISO Id.
151 Id. Cf. Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky.
Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983)(distinguishing uninsured motorist policy actions and first party
actions). See text accompanying notes 170-78 infra.
152 Cf. Sparks v. Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Ariz. 1982) (in-
surer's refusal to pay for timely medical treatment resulted in five-year old child becom-
ing a paraplegic).
'5' See id.
1-4 The insurer is able to predict his potential maximum liability by simple reference
to the policy limits.




commendable characteristic of being consistent with the fun-
damental principles of tort and contract. 156
The traditional rule has significant disadvantages, however.
The rule provides no disincentive to deter insurance companies
from unreasonably denying or delaying the payment of valid
claims. Indeed, the rule seems to have the opposite effect. In ad-
dition, recovery that is always limited to the contract amount may
provide inadequate compensation for damages suffered by the vic-
tim as a consequence of "bad faith." An example helps to illustrate
the abuses permitted by the traditional rule. Assume that an in-
sured's house burns down, with a proven loss of $50,000, and that
the homeowner has insurance for such a loss. Even though no
substantial defenses are available, the insurer has little to lose in
denying or delaying payment. The only added costs to the carrier
are its own legal fees, and interest at the legal rate, assuming the
insured sues. 57 On the other hand, the company might prevail
on an apparently unmeritorious defense. More likely, the insured
will probably accept a settlement for much less than the true value
of his claim, simply because he needs the money now, in order
to provide housing for his family. In effect, the insurance carrier
can hold the insured's recovery hostage, demanding as ransom a
favorable settlement, with little or no attendant risk. The strength
of this leverage is obviously significant.'58
As this scenario illustrates, bad faith is not deterred, extorted
settlements are allowed, and perhaps encouraged, and the insured,
156 See text accompanying notes 30-129 supra.
157 400 S.W.2d at 687. The current legal rate of interest in Kentucky is 8%, and
it seems certain that an insurance company will invest at a substantially higher rate. KRS
§ 360.010 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1980).
158 See Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d at 999 (Clark, J., dissenting). The
relative power of the insurers' position has been recognized by some insurance carners.
In Neal, the court quoted the following section of the defendant's manual for claims
representatives:
It is important for the claims representative to learn how to sense oppor-
tune times for settlement. This will apply whether or not the claimant is
represented by an attoriley. Such things as a marriage or death in the fami-
ly, the purchase of a home or automobile will present the ordinary claimant
with a financial situation which will suggest to hun the admissability of get-
ting his money out of his claim. If the injury is such that settlement may
be tactfully approached, the claims representative should follow through with
appropriate discussion.
582 P.2d at 987 n.8.
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as a matter of reality, does not get the benefit of his bargain. The
effect on the insured may be disastrous.'59 If the insurer is not
deterred from lengthy delays, the compensation may reach the
insured too late to avoid the unfortunate consequences which pro-
mpted him to purchase insurance in the first place. Thus, the
prevailing rule is marred with substantial defects, and a move to
a more effective approach has seemed inevitable for some time.
Whether Feathers is in fact a more effective approach is debatable.
B. The Tort Theory and Feathers v State Farm Insurance
The Kentucky Court of Appeals recently brushed Judd and
Deaton aside, holding that when an insurer wrongfully withholds
payment of first party proceeds, its conduct is tortious and en-
titles the insured to recover consequential and punitive dam-
ages.160 With this ruling, the court of appeals has attempted to
align Kentucky with a growing number of jurisdictions which
recognize a cause of action in tort against an insurance company
which wrongfully refuses to pay claims under first party
policies.' 6' The ultimate effect of Feathers as precedent is not
clear, however, due to the peculiar procedural circumstances sur-
rounding the case. 162
159 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
160 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 1983) reported in 30 Ky. L. S0MM. 9, at 7-8. [hereinafter cited as KLS].
161 See notes 30-93 and accompanying text supra. See also Granelli, supra note 5,
at 1.
162 After the trial court dismissed the case, the plaintiffs appealed to the Kentucky
Court of Appeals, setting in motion a bizarre sequence of events. The parties presented
oral arguments to a panel composed of Judges McDonald, Hayes, and Cooper. After oral
argument, the parties agreed to settle the dispute, and entered into a formal agreement
resolving all issues on July 8, 1983. Motion for Reconsideration at 1, Feathers v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983) [hereinafter
cited as Motion]. The parties filed an agreed order of dismissal with prejudice in the trial
court, Id. at 1, and a joint motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice and to strike it
from the docket of the court of appeals. Id. at 2. The court clerk received the joint motion
on July 18, 1983. Id. The next day, the trial court entered the agreed order and dismissed
with prejudice all claims raised by the complaint. Id. Thus, under usual standards of prac-
tice, the issue before the Kentucky Court of Appeals had become moot.
One week after the notice of settlement had been received, the court of appeals,
through Judge McDonald, rendered an opimon reversing the trial court's dismissal of the
tort claim. No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 8. Five days later, the court denied the parties'
joint motion to dismiss, stating that the court had rendered its opinion. Motion at 2. The
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The case began when the home of Arthur and Mary Jane
Feathers was destroyed by fire. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.
insured the home against fire, but declined payment alleging that
the proof of loss filed by the insured contained misrepre-
sentations.16 The Feathers claimed that State Farm's refusal to
pay constituted a breach of the duty to act in good faith, and sought
damages for "acute anxiety and mental suffering, and loss of con-
sortium," in addition to the amount due under the contract. 6 4 In
answer, State Farm denied bad faith, citing its reasonable belief
that the home was destroyed as the result of the Feathers' arson.
The trial court granted State Farm's motion for judgment on the
decision has been published in Kentucky Law Summary (30 KLS 9, at 8) and is designated
to be published in the official reporter unless further action is taken. See Ky. R. Civ. P.
76.28(4) (a) [hereinafter cited as CR]. State Farm has filed a petition for rehearing seeking
only to have the opinion withdrawn and an order of dismissal entered. If the petition is
not granted, the possibility of an appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court remains, but
the issue may not be appealable because the underlying case is moot. Meanwhile, the panel
of the court of appeals has issued an opinion of uncertain authority that threatens to alter
drastically previous practices of the insurance industry and bar of Kentucky. Regardless
of the ultimate status of Feathers, its inevitable offspring must force consideration of the
issue by the Kentucky Supreme Court in the near future.
Interestingly, Judge McDonald also authored Craft v. Rice, No. 82-CA-1346-MR
(Ky. Ct. App. Apr. 22, 1983), reported m 30 KLS 6, at 2, which recognized the inten-
tional tort of outrage. In Craft, Judge McDonald, citing Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W 1079
(Ky. 1903) and Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d 406 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), stated that
in light of the new tort of outrage "the conduct described as non-actionable in Reed and
Browning , one a sexual intercourse solicitation and the latter an intentional inflic-
tion of emotional injury, is now subject to re-examination." Craft v. Rice, No.
82-CA-1346-MR, slip op. at 8-9. Both Reed and Browning require a finding of "impact"
before a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress. Reed v. Maley, 74 S.W
at 1080; Browning v. Browning, 584 S.W.2d at 408.
In light of the Feathers and Craft opinions, both authored by Judge McDonald, it
seems that the court of appeals has embarked on a re-examination of Kentucky tort law.
Perhaps the impact rule will be the next issue chosen for re-examination.
163 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 1-3.
State Farm's answer admitted a duty to act in good faith, but argued that:
[Tihe fire gives rise to the reasonable belief that said fire was the result of
arson and that [the plaintiffs] or one of them with the knowledge of the other,
burned or procured the burning of the dwelling house referred to in Plain-
tiffs' complaint. Said intentional burning of said dwelling house constituted
fraud and voided the above-mentioned policy of insurance.
Id. at 2.
16 Id.
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pleadings and dismissed the case, 16 but the court of appeals re-
versed.16
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky attempted to distinguish
the prior Kentucky first party cases that would otherwise have
controlled the result in Feathers,16 and adopted the tort theory,
citing Gruenberg.16 Unfortunately, the court's attempted dis-
tinctions of Judd and Deaton are not persuasive. Indeed, the
Feathers holding implicitly overrules those cases.
Although both plaintiffs and defendant agreed at oral argu-
ment that the case was controlled by Deaton,16 9 with the plain-
tiffs asking the court to overrule that case, the Feathers court
distinguished Deaton on the ground that it involved uninsured
motorist coverage.170 The court stated: "[I]n Deaton, we have no
pure first party action because it was an action on contract founded
in tort. The uninsured motorist coverage provided that the com-
pany would pay to the insured legal damages that the uninsured
motorist was obligated to pay."'7 This distinction in types of in-
surance coverage, however, does not justify different treatment
with respect to the duties owed by the insurer to the insured. In
both instances, the insurance company is obligated to make pay-
ment in good faith directly to the insured under the terms of the
contract.
Other courts have had no difficulty in applying the same rule
to both first party cases and uninsured motorist cases. For exam-
ple, the California Supreme Court applied the Gruenberg rule to
an uninsured motorist claim, when the situation was presented
in Neal v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.172 Neal did not suggest
that uninsured motorist claims are to be treated differently than
any other first party claim. Instead, the court held that an insurer
commits the tort of first party bad faith when it breaches the du-
168 Id. at3.
166 Id.
167Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 5-7.
168 See td. at 7-8. See also text accompanying notes 30-46 supra.
169 Id. at 5.
170 Id. at 5-6.
171 Id. at 6.
172 582 P.2d at 980, 985-86.
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ty 173 to deal fairly with its insured. Moreover, Gruenberg itself
relied on Richardson v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp.,74
another uninsured motorist case. 75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in Craft v. Economy Fire ? Casualty Co., 16 has also considered
whether uninsured motorist insurance claims are distinguishable
from other first party coverage cases. Although Indiana law had
implied the existence of the duty of good faith with regard to fire
and life insurance, Economy, being sued for breach of this duty,
argued that uninsured motorist coverage was materially different
and therefore the duty did not apply.'7 The Seventh Circuit re-
jected this contention, and held that uninsured motorist coverage
should be treated just as other first party insurance.
78
The Kentucky Court of Appeals distinguished Feathers from
the cases of Deaton and Judd on an additional ground.'7 The
court in Deaton had stated: "[A]lthough appellants allege that this
is a tort action, this court is of the opinion that this is a breach
of contract action."'180 Likewise, the Judd Court labeled the ac-
tion before it as one for breach of contract.' 8' The court in
Feathers summarily distinguished Judd and Deaton: "[W]e con-
clude the converse: we have a tort action."' 182
173 Id. Although the facts of Neal concerned an umnsured motorist's policy, the court
held:
In the so-called "third party" situation, of which Comunale and Crtsct are
representative, the breach of duty may have as its proximate result the en-
try of a judgment in excess of policy limits against the insured. In a situa-
tion such as that before us, which the parties hereto are pleased to term a
"first party" situation, the injuries of the plaintiff, being sustained prior to
the alleged breach, cannot be a proximate result of that breach, and therefore
cannot serve as a proper measure of damages.
Id. at 988. Thus, the court accepted the parties' characterization of this action as first
party bad faith.
'74 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
175 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d at 1037
178 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978)(applying Indiana law).
177 I1 at 567.
178 Id. at 570.
'" See Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op.
at 7.
180 Deaton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 548 S.W.2d at 164.
181 400 S.W.2d at 687.
182 No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 7.
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This conclusory reasoning begs the question. The Issue for deci-
sion is whether the action is one in tort or contract. Judd and
Deaton implicitly found that no independent duty owed to the
insured was violated, and thus limited the remedies to those
available in contract. Despite the assertions of the court of ap-
peals, these holdings are inconsistent with the new rule announc-
ed in Feathers.183
Unfortunately, Feathers fails to articulate satisfactorily the in-
dependent duty necessary to find a tort. In fact, the court scarce-
ly referred to this critical issue, relegating it to the last page of
the opinion, where it stated:
Nevertheless, once the policyholder has substantially complied
with and performed the terms and conditions reqmred by the
policy, then at that point the insurance company becomes alan
to a fiduciary as to the sums owed under the policy The pro-
ceeds of the policy may not be withheld unless there is a substan-
tial breach of the contract by the policyholder. We simply
say that if State Farm was not justified in its actions, then its
conduct was tortious against the policyholder for which conse-
quential and punitive damages may be presented to the fact
finder.&I
The court dealt with the requisite of an independent duty in
cursory fashion with the conclusory statement that the company
becomes "alan to a fiduciary."'' 8 Apparently, the court held that
this transformation occurs whenever the policyholder has com-
plied with the terms and conditions of the policy. Of course, when
an insurance company denies payment it is alleging that the
policyholder has not complied with the terms and conditions
necessary for payment. Under this rationale if the company is
ultimately judged to have been incorrect, it is not simply in breach
of contract; rather, it has committed a tort. The literal language
of the opinion does not require intent or subjective bad faith as
183 The court of appeals was compelled to find some method to distinguish Judd,
even an artificial one, since Judd was issued from Kentucky's highest court. See id. at 6-7.
Deaton, a case that seems identical to Feathers, may have been distinguished, rather than
overruled, because a member of the Feathers panel, Chief Judge Hayes, authored Deaton.






an element of the tort. This brief passage may ultimately prove
to be judicial quicksand, for if the quality of conduct has no
relevance to the issue of liability, the court has created something
akin to strict liability. 8 6 Surely the court did not intend this
result, but it is the only reasonable construction of the language
employed.
The court in Feathers stated that if State Farm was not justified
in declining payment then its conduct was tortious.' s7 In essence,
the court held that to determine if a tort has been committed, one
must look to the contract; if the contract did not justify State
Farm's actions, it committed a tort. This reasoning cannot be
reconciled with fundamental principles of tort law. If the actions
truly constitute a tort, reference to the contract should be un-
necessary. To have a tort, a duty that arises independently of the
contract must be breached. 18 If the duty breached is indepen-
dent of the contract, one need not refer to the contract to measure
the actions. If State Farm was not justified in its actions, then its
conduct was in breach of contract, but'it cannot correctly be con-
sidered tortious simply because it was not justified under the policy.
Despite the conceptual infirmities of the Gruenberg/Feathers
rule, it does promote desirable public policy objectives. Certain-
ly, this rule maximizes the deterrence of bad faith. Moreover, this
rule fully compensates the mistreated insured for all injuries.
However, the disadvantages greatly outweigh the advantages of
the tort theory of recovery The theory is simply conceptually un-
sound. When the courts convert contract actions into tort actions
simply by describing the transaction as a breach of a "fiduciary
duty," the certainty of the law is sacrificed. Separating insurance
contracts from other consensual relationships will be increasing-
ly difficult, and tort recoveries for breach of contract will have
undesirable policy ramifications.189
Furthermore, the tort theory of recovery does little to protect
insurers from the natural prejudice of juries. First party bad faith
186 See Neal v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 999 (Cal. 1978)(Clark, J.,
dissenting).
187 No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 8.
188 W PROSSER, supra note 45, at 143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281a
(1965). See also text accompanying notes 45-53 supra.
189 See text accompanying notes 76-94 supra.
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cases have resulted in extremely high punitive damage awards.'0
The Sparks case resulted in three million dollars in punitive
damages.' 91 Although the award may not seem excessive in view
of the suffering of the Sparks family, it must be recalled that
punitive damages are in no way compensatory and should only
be awarded to punish and deter egregious conduct. 192 In Sparks,
the insurer did not directly cause the injuries, but only refused
to pay for their treatment because it felt it had a reasonable and
valid defense. 93
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. 194 provides
another example of an excessive punitive damage award. In that
case, the jury returned a verdict for $45,600 in general damages
and $78,000 for emotional distress.95 The jury also awarded the
plaintiff five million dollars in punitive damages.' 96 The fact that
the court vacated this award as excessive is unlikely to comfort
insurers facing similar allegations. In Neal, the dissent noted that
these huge punitive damage awards are simply passed on to the
premium paying public. 117 . They are, in effect, a publicly sub-
sidized windfall to the plaintiff.1g8
The spectre of seven figure punitive damage awards will no
doubt lead insurance carriers to avoid the risk of an adverse ver-
dict, and to forego defense of at least some possibly meritorious
claims. Again, the added cost will be passed on to the public.'19
These shortcomings of the tort theory of recovery counsel closer
examination of the alternatives, as matters of both law and policy
C. A Proposed Common Law Theory
According to the prevailing rule in Kentucky prior to Feathers,
a first party bad faith case is no more than a breach of contract
190 See Granelli, Good Times For Bad Faith, Nat'l L.J., July 11, 1982, at 11, col. 2.
191 Sparks v. Republic Natl Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d at 1132.
192 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1965). See also D. DOBBS, note
48 supra at 204-05.
193 647 P.2d at 1132.
194 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 144.





claim.200 After determining that the action is one for breach of
contract, Kentucky courts have applied the traditional measure
of damages: the money owed under the contract plus interest. 20'
However, limiting damages to this amount is not preordained by
general principles of damages. While the courts have failed to con-
sider what, if any, consequential damages should be allowed in
addition to the money owed under the contract, extra-contractual
damages may be allowed for breach of a first party insurance con-
tract in a manner consistent with existing Kentucky case law. These
damages would include, in a proper case, awards for mental
anguish as well as damages for injury to pecumary interests. Not
only could the allowance of such damages be rationalized under
existing Kentucky common law, but the theory is consistent with
fundamental principles of contract law
Kentucky adheres to the universal rule of foreseeability de-
scended from Hadley v. Baxendale,22 that, on proof of breach,
the plaintiff in a contract action is entitled to "all such damages
as arise naturally from the breach of the rights which that con-
tract was contemplated to assure." Proper analysis must con-
sider whether the Hadley v. Baxendale rule precludes consequential
damages in breach of insurance contract cases.
Interestingly, Feathers gives strong hint of adopting a per-
sonal/commercial contract distinction that would facilitate
foreseeability analysis. Unfortunately, the court failed to continue
this line of reasoning and instead adopted the Gruenberg cause
of action in tort.2 In discussing the nature of the homeowner's
insurance contract before it, the Feathers court stated:
In our opinion, the homeowner's fire policy is umque. We are
not dealing with the purchase and sale of a box of shoe laces.
The purchaser of a fire insurance policy is buying peace of mind
and a cushion to help himself in the event his home is damaged
or destroyed. He is usually economically devastated after a fire
200 See, e.g., Clark v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 53 S.W.2d at 969.
201 See id.
202 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
203 Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Ky. 1961)(quoting OLECK, DAMAGES TO
PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 85, at 73-74 (Rev. ed. 1957)).
204 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 7-8.
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and may have no source of money to replace what he has lost
other than the proceeds of the insurance policy he has purchas-
ed and relied upon.2
Apparently, the Feathers court was tempted to distinguish first
party insurance contracts from everyday commercial agreements.
The court noted that the policyholder is purchasing peace of mind,
and describes what the Kewtn dissent would characterize as a per-
sonal contract.2 The court could have easily continued in that
vein, and found that the homeowner's policy was personal in
nature. Under the Hadley rule the damages claimed for mental
anguish were foreseeable, and thus recoverable. From a concep-
tual standpoint, an award of damages on this basis would have
been much more palatable than the alchemy involved in transform-
ing the breach of contract into a tort action.
Kentucky case law provides support for utilizing the per-
sonal/commercial contract distinction as a basis for the award of
consequential damages. For example, in Postal Telegraph Cable
Co. v. Terrell,2°7 the plaintiff, Mrs. Lou Terrell, was traveling
by train from Louisville to visit her father in Memphis, Tennessee.
The train was to arrive in Memphis late at night. That evening,
Mrs. Terrell's husband sent her father a telegram to advise him
of his daughter's impending arrival, intending that he meet her
at the station. The telegram reached Memphis in due course but
for some unexplained reason was not delivered to Mrs. Terrell's
father.2m As a result, upon her arrival in the Memphis station at
2:00 a.m., she had no means of transportation to her father's home,
about three miles away. Traveling with her were her two children,
ages three and one.m Mrs. Terrell testified that "there were men
dressed very rough in overalls with trousers tucked in their boots,
lying on the floor of the depot, and that she was worried and
frightened, and suffered mental anguish by having to remain there
205 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
M Compare No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 7 with Kewm v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d at 69-70 (Williams, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
See also text accompanying notes 106-29 supra.
207 100 S.W 292 (Ky. 1907).
208 Id.
209 Id. at 292-93.
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until morning."210 Plaintiff sued for breach of the contract to
deliver the telegram, and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff
in the sum of $500, which included damages for emotional distress.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld this award, explaimng:
Delay in the announcement of a death, an arrival, the straying
or recovery of a child, and the like, may often be productive of
an injury to the feelings, which cannot easily be estimated in
money, but for which a jury should be at liberty to award fair
damages. Yet in such cases the damages ought not to be enhanc-
ed by evidence of any circumstances which could not reasonably
have been anticipated as probable from the language of the writ-
ten message. 2
1'
The Court thus adopted the same line of reasoning advocated by
the Kewin dissent, namely, that mental distress damages can be
awarded for breach of contract if the contract is personal, in-
dicating that the damages are foreseeable.12 The Terrell Court
elaborated on its holding when it stated: "[I]f, as argued, the law
does not deal generally with the feelings and emotions, it may be
answered that here the parties themselves have contracted with
respect to those things, or, at least, have contracted with respect
to those things which naturally affect the feelings and emo-
tions. '" 21 3 Finding that the telegram itself apprised the defendant
that breach of its contract of delivery would result in emotional
distress, the Court upheld the award of damages.2 14 Essentially,
this ruling was nothing more than finding that plaintiff had fulfill-
ed the Hadley v. Baxendale reqmrement for the award of this par-
ticular type of damage. The requirement was fulfilled because by
the very nature of the contract emotional distress could reasonably
have been foreseen as a consequence of the breach by the defen-
dant at the time of the making of the contract.
210 Id. at 293.
211 Id. at 294 (quoting T. SHEARMAN AND A. REDFIELD, SHEARMAN & REDFIELD ON
NEcLICENCE § 605, at 694 (3d ed. 1974)).
212 Cf. Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d at 60 (Williams,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
213 Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Terrell, 100 S.W at 294 (quoting Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Van Cleave, 54 S.W 827, 828 (Ky. 1900)).
-214 Id. at 295.
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The Terrell rationale should also be applied in analyzing claims
of first party bad faith. Of course, as noted in the Kewin dissent,
bad faith becomes a misnomer because the quality of breach is
unimportant; a good faith breach will produce the same damages
as a malicious or bad faith refusal to pay policy proceeds.215 The
inquiry under Terrell is whether the insurance policy itself ap-
prised the defendant that mental suffering might reasonably be
anticipated from the failure to pay the policy proceeds upon the
fulfillment of all conditions precedent. If mental suffering should
have been anticipated, then it is a foreseeable consequence of the
breach, and damages are recoverable.2 16 This approach is not a
radical departure from existing law, but is rather an application
of it. Employing the ancient test of foreseeability is a sounder ap-
proach than is applying a mechanical damage formula with little
or no consideration of the underlying legal principles and policy
objectives.
The personal/commercial contract analysis does not mandate
automatic victory for insureds, and the question as to which side
of the line a particular policy falls will often be close. Indeed, in-
surers might plausibly assert that all first party insurance contracts
are commercial in nature. Such an argument might run as follows:
As noted by the Kewin dissent, certain types of contracts, such
as for the delivery of death messages or to marry, have been tradi-
tionally categorized as personal contracts. In each such instance,
it appears that the very act of performance by the potential defen-
dant is bound up with the personal feelings. For example, in a
contract to marry, the act of performance is marrying the pro-
misee. This very act, all could agree, involves the personal feel-
ings of the promisee. The act of performing an insurance contract
in the payment of money is not tied to the emotions, and, arguably,
is therefore not a personal contract. Should the personal/commer-
cial distinction be drawn by analyzing only the act of the pro-
misor's performance, insurance contracts would invariably be
labelled commercial. The analysis, however, should not be so
limited. The focus of the personal/commercial analysis should be
215 See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d at 71 (Williams,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
216 Cf. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Terrell, 100 S.W at 295.
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on the substance of the contract, and the nature of the interests
protected. Even when so viewed, reasonable people may differ
as to which side of the line a particular insurance policy belongs.
Further, a determination that a particular insurance policy
is commercial in nature does not automatically foreclose recovery
of consequential damages. The rule of Hadley v. Baxendale has
two aspects. Recovery of consequential damages is allowed if the
evidence shows that the damages either (1) result naturally from
the breach, or (2) were, at the time the contract was made, in
the contemplation of the parties as a likely result of breach.2 17 A
court then might examine homeowners coverage and determine
that the contract is commercial in nature. Thus, damages for men-
tal anguish would not result naturally from the breach. Recovery
of consequential damages might not be foreclosed, however, if the
plaintiff can prove that due to circumstances peculiar to that trans-
action, the claimed damages were within the contemplation of
the parties when the contract was made.
Before leaving Terrell, it is important to note that the Court
emphasized that its allowance of consequential damages in this
kind of case is "not confined to telegrams announcing the sickness
or death of a near relative, but extends to all those cases where
mental suffering may be reasonably anticipated as a natural result
of the breach of the contract, and this can be shown by the face
of the telegram." 21 The Terrell analysis should be applied in all
cases, including contracts for insurance, where the consequential
damages might be foreseeable. Subsequent cases have unfortunate-
ly described the Terrell holding as an exception to the general rule
that emotional distress is not an element of damage for breach
of contract.2 19 The Terrell rule is not an exception but rather the
proper application of the general rule which states that special
damages arising from a breach of contract are recoverable if they
were reasonably in the contemplation of the parties when the con-
217 See quotation accompanying note 105 supra. See also D. DOBBS, supra note 48,
at 804.
218 100 S.W at 295.
219 See e.g., Archer v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 F Supp. 145, 147 (W.D. Ky.
1952) ("The exception to this rule [disallowing emotional distress damages in contract cases]
is damages arising out of a failure to transmit a death message by a public communica-
tion agency.").
[Vol. 72
FIRST PARTY BAD FAITH
tract was made. In most situations, mental anguish is not an
element of damages that can be said to have been reasonably in
the contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. Ter-
rell, and arguably Kewin, presented situations in which the par-
ties did contemplate such damages. In those cases, mental anguish
was a foreseeable consequence of the breach and therefore
recoverable.2I The fact that mental anguish damages are not
foreseeable in most cases does not make the award of such damages
in an appropriate case an exception to the general rule, but rather
the natural result of its proper application. In addition to er-
roneously characterizing such cases as Terrell as an exception to
the general rule, some courts, applying Kentucky law, have ap-
parently overlooked Terrell altogether.2 This potentially impor-
tant case unfortunately seems to have been lost in the backwaters
of Kentucky decisional law.
The contract approach to first party bad faith cases carries
with it certain advantages. It is supported both by general legal
pnnciples,22 and by existing case law in Kentucky 22From the
insurer's perspective, the contract theory provides insulation from
"runaway juries." Punitive damages would not be recoverable since
the case would still be in contract, not tort. While emotional
distress recoveries are not amenable to precise measurement, at
least some proof of causation and evidence sufficient to make other
types of consequential damages reasonably ascertainable would
be required. Without such proof, the trial judge would be called
upon to take the case from the jury.
From the insured's viewpoint, the contract theory provides
compensation for all provable injuries. The insured would not be
called upon to prove "bad faith" of the insurer, removing this
troubling element from the case. All plaintiffs who could prove
damages from a breach of a first party insurance contract would
220 See 100 S.W at 295. See also Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. at 145.
22 See 100 S.W at 290; 295 N.W.2d at 50.
2 See, e.g., 107 F Supp. at 147 (stating that the exception to the general rule is
a "failure to transmit a death message by a public commumcation agency") (emphasis add-
ed). Terrell makes it clear that death message cases are not the only ones for which emo-
tional distress damages may be recovered. 100 S.W at 295.
22 See text accompanying notes 95-128 supra.
2 See text accompanying notes 207-222 supra.
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be compensated for their injuries, not just those who can prove
the further element of bad faith. The injuries are just as real,
whether produced in good or bad faith.m
As with the other alternatives, certain disadvantages are pre-
sent in the contract theory. Although jury prejudice is reduced,
it will still be a factor in cases where mental anguish is claimed.
Because damages for mental anguish are not susceptible to precise
measurement, juries might attempt to use such awards as a
substitute for punitive damages. In addition, this theory removes
the insurer's defense of good faith. Because the quality of conduct
is not a relevant inquiry, the insurer is liable for consequential
damages regardless of its reasonableness in contesting a fairly
debatable claim.
Although conceptually sound, application of the contract
theory would also have the unfortunate effect of leaving the law
of first party bad faith unsettled. Each particular type of insurance,
and each type of injury produced by its breach, would have to
be analyzed on a case by case basis in terms of foreseeability For
example, a court could quite consistently hold a disability insurance
policy to be "personal," and therefore award damages for mental
anguish from its breach, while finding property insurance to be
"commercial," limiting damages to the amount due under the con-
tract. It could be quite some time before the wide range of in-
surance policies are considered by the courts. In the interim, in-
surers and insureds would have no certainty Additional problems
would be raised by the status of the insured. For example, the
owner of a sole proprietorship suffering a fire loss to his business
might convince the courts to award consequential damages, in-
cluding emotional distress. This would not be possible if the sole
proprietorship were incorporated, for a corporation cannot sus-
tain emotional distress. Such artificial distinctions seem unfair,
but are inherent in the contract theory.
In summary, as with any accommodation of competing in-
terests, the contract theory has its shortcomings. On balance,
however, it is the most desirable of the available common law solu-
tions to the problem of first party bad faith. It is conceptually
225 See Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d at 57 (Williams,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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sound, and provides a balance between two competing policy
goals. 22 Absent legislative action in the field, the contract theory
should be seriously considered by Kentucky courts.
III. TowARDs A LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION
The problems created by first party bad faith are complex,
and the common law has failed to provide an adequate
solution.2 7 The situation begs for legislative action to weigh the
competing policies and establish an appropriate balance.
On January 29, 1982, Rep. Jim LeMaster introduced House
Bill No. 360 in the Kentucky House of Representatives. 2 2 This
bill proposed a new section to the Kentucky Insurance Code.22
The proposed bill attempted to establish a statutory framework
to govern the claims settlement practices of insurers.210 The bill
passed the House of Representatives unanimously, but failed to
emerge from the Senate Committee on Insurance.
Because Feathers will undoubtedly revive interest in a
legislative alternative, an examination of this proposed bill and
a consideration of its possible effect on claims of first party bad
faith is important. Additionally, Feathers has generated great con-
cern in the insurance industry, which may encourage the legislature
to adopt a similar act in the hope of avoiding the unpredictable
consequences that may flow from Feathers.
A. Kentucky's Insurance Code
The Kentucky Insurance Code creates an insurance depart-
ment headed by an insurance commissioner, who is appointed by
the governor for a four year term.23' The Department of In-
surance has jurisdiction over "every person engaged as principal
and as indemnitor, surety, or contractor in the business of enter-
ing into contracts of insurance."' 2 The Code empowers the com-
26 See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
227 See text accompanying notes 23-129 supra.
228 H.R. 360, 1982 Reg. Sess.
29 KRS ch. 304 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
230 See H.R. 360, supra note 228, at 1.
231 See KRS § 304.2-020 (1982).
232 KRS § 304.2-100 (1982).
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missioner to enforce its provisions and to investigate violations.23
Further, the commissioner may promulgate rules and regulations
establishing standards for compliance with the provisions of the
Code.2
The existing Code prohibits undesirable business practices such
as the use of false financial statements, defamation, boycott, coer-
cion and intimidation, unfair discrimination, discriminatory demal
of insurance, and rebates.23 Although the Code does not express-
ly prohibit an insurer from denying a first party claim in bad faith,
it does contain a general admonition against unfair or deceptive
practices: "No person shall engage in this state in any practice
which is prohibited in this subtitle, or which is defined therein
as, or determined pursuant thereto to be, an unfair method of com-
petition or any unfair or deceptive act or practice in the business
of insurance."2 3 Thus, the existing code implicitly authorizes the
commissioner to charge an insurer with first party bad faith.2 37
This provision could at least be utilized to deter bad faith con-
duct. However, the Code does not expressly provide a private right
of action through which an insured may seek compensation for
damages suffered due to bad faith.
B. Kentucky's Proposed Unfair Claims Settlement
Practices Act
As originally introduced by Representative LeMaster, House
Bill No. 360 was an attempt to fill the void in the Code by pro-
viding an enumeration of unfair claims settlement practices and
233 See KRS § 304.1-040 (1982).
234 See KRS § 304.2-110 (1982).
235 See KRS §§ 304.12-040-100 (1982).
236 KRS § 304.12-010 (1982).
237 The existing code does not contain an express provision that affirmatively pro-
hibits an insurer from denying a first party claim in bad faith. Instead, the Code pro-
hibits certain enumerated conduct. See text accompanying notes 241-250 infra. The Code
allows the commissioner, however, to pumsh certain conduct not specifically enumerated.
KRS § 304.12-130 (1982) provides:
(1) If the commissioner believes that any person engaged in the insurance
business is engaging in this state in any method of competition or in any act
or practice in the conduct of such business which is not defined in this subti-
tle but such act or practice is unfair or deceptive and that a proceeding
by him in respect thereto would be in the public interest, he shall, after a
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expanding the available remedies.m The Lemaster bill was
designed to address both first party and third party claims.239 A
"first party claimant" as defined by the bill includes "an individual,
corporation, association, partnership or other legal entity asser-
ting a right to payment'under an insurance policy or insurance
contract arising out of the occurrence of the contingency or loss
covered by such policy or contract." 240
Significantly, the bill attempted to define unfair claims set-
tlement practices by listing thirteen specific instances of such con-
duct. Specific practices designated as unfair included: misrepresen-
tation of policy provisions; 241 failure to provide for prompt in-
vestigation of claims under insurance policies; 242 failure to
negotiate in good faith to settle disputes over claims; 24 3 un-
justified offers of inadequate amounts, forcing insureds to institute
litigation;244 and failure to provide a prompt and reasonable ex-
planation for denial of a claim, or for the offer of a compromise
settlement.245 The provision also contains a residual clause that
prohibits "any other act or practice in connection with claims set-
tlement which is unfair or deceptive." 24
The proposed bill also expressly created a private right of ac-
tion by the first party claimant if he has been "aggrieved by the
use of or employment by another person of an unfair claims set-
tlement practice."'24 7 The bill provided: "(b) Such an action may
be brought to enjoin and to restrain any violation of this chapter
and, in addition thereto, for the recovery of damages. The court
may in its discretion, award actual damages and may provide for
hearing of which notice of the hearing and of the charges against hun are
given such person, make a written report of his findings of fact relative to
such charges and serve a copy thereof upon such person and any intervenor
at the hearing.
2 H.R. 360, supra note 228, at § 3.
239 Id. at § i(a)-(b).
240 Id. at § I(a).
24' Id. at § 3(a).
242 Id. at § 3(c),(d).
243 Id at § 3(f).
244 Id. at § 3(g).
245 Id. at § 3(m).
246 Id. at § 3(n).
247 Id. at § 5.
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such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper." The bill
departed from existing law in that it requires the court to award
damages,2 9 rather than the jury.2
The LeMaster bill stated: "[N]othing in this subsection shall
be construed to limit a person's right to seek punitive damages
where appropriate."2 51 The bill also allows a court to assess
"reasonable attorney's fees and costs" against the insurer when the
first party claimant prevails.252 These two provisions encourage
plaintiffs to bring first party claims, and they will undoubtedly
generate additional litigation. Unfortunately, in effectuating the
policy objectives of compensation and deterrence of bad conduct,
the statute sacrifices the competing policy of avoiding disincen-
tives that discourage insurers from defending questionable claims.
The proposed bill does not purport to provide any standards
for a court to employ when determining what quality of conduct
constitutes an unfair claims settlement practice other than the
enumerated circumstances and the general prohibition against "un-
fair or deceptive" practices. Interestingly, a general provision of
the Code prohibits the assessment of an administrative penalty
when the insurer acts in good faith.25 Through his regulatory
power, the commissioner may be in a position to direct the courts
in determimng whether the practices of an insured constitute first
party bad faith. Without such guidance, however, the Kentucky
courts will be left to examine how other state courts interpret





252 Id. at § 5(d).
953 The commissioner may punish the insurer under the existing code as follows:
Any person who willfully violates any rule, regulations, or order of the com-
missioner, shall, except where other penalty is expressly provided, be sub-
ject to such suspension or revocation of certificate of authority or license,
or administrative fine in lieu of such suspension or revocation as may be ap-
plicable under this Code for violation of the provision to which such rule,
regulation or order relates.
KRS § 304.2-140 (1982).
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C. Unfair Clatms Settlement Practices Act Applied
Several jurisdictions have adopted statutes defining and pro-
scribing unfair claims settlement practices.25 Some courts have
held that the statute preempts common law remedies,2, while
others have adopted the tort theory, despite the presence of the
statute.25
Courts finding a tort have reasoned that the statute creates
the independent duty of the insurer to act in good faith and deal
fairly with its insured. Violation of this duty established the tort.
Before a tort can be recognized, however, the court must deter-
mine whether the legislature intended to preempt the field and
thereby foreclose the availability of common law tort remedies.
For example, the court in the Sparks case was required to inter-
pret an Arizona statute prohibiting misrepresentation and false
advertising of insurance policies.11 That provision of the Arizona
Insurance Code did not expressly mandate a private right of
action. 25 Nevertheless, the court reasoned that a right of action
was implied by the Code. The court relied on the language of the
statute which stated that neither the insurance director nor the
court "may in any manner relieve or absolve any person.. .from
any other liability, penalty or forfeiture under law."z The court
acknowledged that the Arizona Insurance Code allowed the state's
director of insurance to issue cease and desist orders to enjoin acts
or practices in violation of the department's regulations.M Not-
withstanding this power, the court found that the private right
of action was preserved "irrespective of governmental action
against the insurer."2' 1 Sparks also relied on Sellinger v. Freeway
Mobile Home Sales, Inc.,262 a case which followed a similar ra-
tionale in interpreting the state's Consumer Fraud Act.
254 See, e.g., Sparks v Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127, 1138-39 (Ariz.
1982); Lynch v. Mid-America Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 418 N.E.2d. 421, 424-26 (In. App.
Ct. 1981); Coleman v. American Umversal Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 220,221-22 (Wis. 1979).
25 See text accompanying notes 263-69 infra.
M5 See text accompanying notes 257-62 & 270-74 tinra.
W7 647 P.2d at 1138.
2M Id.
259 Id at 1139 (quoting ARmz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-456(c) (1975)).
M Id.
261 Id.
262 521 P.2d 1119 (Ariz. 1974). In Sallinger, the buyer sued the seller of a mobile
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In Oregon, the statutory scheme provides for the imposition
of civil penalties for the commission of unfair trade practces.2
If found guilty of an unfair practice, the insurer is required to
pay the state treasury a civil penalty ranging from $2,000 -
$10,000.26 The Supreme Court of Oregon considered the effect
of this statute on a common law.contract action in Farris v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.26 Although the facts of the case
occurred in a third party context, the court found the tort theory
did not apply since, in refusing to defend the insured at the outset
of litigation, the insurer never assumed the fiduciary duty necessary
to give rise to a tort.2 Because the court characterized the ac-
tion as one for breach of contract, the case has direct preceden-
tial value for the first party context.
Farris considered whether the statutory provision providing
for civil penalties prevents the insured from recovering consequen-
tial damages in a breach of contract action.2 The court first
noted that the statute sought to "prohibit insurance companies from
intentionally breaching their contract to settle their insureds' claims
as defendants did here and to inflict certain consequences for so
doing." m The court then interpreted the scope of the statute:
Because the statutes did provide for the payment of damages n6t
usually recoverable in such a situation, it would appear that had
the legislature intended to enlarge the damages further, it would
have so provided. It was certainly not intended by the legislature
that additional pressure to perform the contract be exerted by
allowing the recovery of damages for emotional distress, since
the statute provides for civil damages recoverable by the state
for that purpose. There is nothing to indicate that the legislature
intended, when it prohibited certain claims settlement practices
in ORS 746.230, that actions for breach of insurance contracts
home, complaining of numerous defects and shoddy workmanship. Although the Arizona
Consumer Fraud Act does not contain language expressly authorizing a private right of
action for violations of the Act, the Arizona Supreme Court held that such a right of ac-
tion was "inferentially" created by the statute.
263 OR. REv. STAT. § 731.988 (1981).
64 Id.
-M 587 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1978).
266 Id. at 1019.
27 Id. at 1017-18.
M Id. at 1018.
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would be transformed, in all of the covered instances, into tort
actions with a resulting change in the measure of damages. The
statutes express no public policy which would promote damages
for emotional distress. Concern about the insured's peace of mind
does not appear to be the gravamen of the statutory policy 1.9
Thus, the Oregon court concluded that consequential damages
were precluded by the existence of the statute, and that the
legislature did not intend to enlarge remedies available at com-
mon law.
The existence of a civil penalty statute or an exclusivity pro-
vision has not prevented other courts from recognizing the tort
theory For example, in Lynch v. Mid-America Fire and Marine
Insurance Co.,270 the Illinois court rejected the preemption argu-
ment and recognized a common law tort of first party bad faith,
despite the existence of a statute permitting the court to award
to an insured suing on a policy certain costs and attorney's fees
if the insurer's conduct has been "vexatious" and "unrea-
sonable."27 The court reasoned: "[T]he tenor of the section gives
no indication that it was intended to cover the field of awarding
compensation for bad faith or vexatious dealing by insurers."2 72
Similarly, in Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co.,273
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was confronted with the preemp-
tion issue in the context of a worker's compensation insurance
claim. The court held: "[W]here a worker's compensation insurer
acts in bad faith in the settlement or payment of compensation
benefits, a separate tort is committed that is not within the pur-
view of the exclusivity provisions of the worker's compensation
law."2 74 Thus, this court found the existence of a comprehensive
statutory scheme did not preclude plaintiff from bringing a com-
mon law tort claim for an injury not directly addressed by the act.
The LeMaster bill makes significant progress by its attempt
to define unfair claims practices. Nevertheless, it does not address
2SId.
270 418 N.E.2d at 421.
27' Id. at 424.
272 Id. at 425.
273 273 N.W.2d at 220.
274 Id. at 221.
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certain serious problems. As the bill is drafted, it apparently con-
templates remedies not unlike those available under common law
tort theory, for insureds that are alleged to be victims of first par-
ty bad-faith.It does not, however, provide clear guidance on the
quality of conduct that constitutes an unfair claim settlement prac-
tice, nor is it precise as to when, if ever, punitive damages should
be awarded. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a Kentucky
court interpreting the LeMaster bill would conclude that the tort
theory is the law of this state. While it is certainly within the
legislative prerogative to create such a right of action, another
legislative approach should be considered that serves public policy
from the perspective of both the insured and the insurer.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
This Article has frequently discussed the Issues of first party
bad faith in the context of Sparks v. Republic National Life In-
surance Co., 75 a case that emphasizes the shocking consequences
that may result from an erroneous termination of coverage by an
insurer. Sparks also provides perspective for the dilemma posed
by the two competing policy objectives inherent in claims of first
party bad faith. The first objective recognizes that an insured's
cause of action for first party bad faith should entitle him to
damages promised under the policy, and consequential damages
"within the contemplation of the parties." z 6 The second public
policy implicated by first party bad faith is that the risks of ex-
cessive judgments should not be so unreasonable that they
discourage insurers from challenging claims that are at least fair-
ly debatable. 7 Any effective resolution of the problem must ad-
dress these two policy goals.
The difficult questions raised by first party bad faith require
a careful balancing of the competing interests. Unfortunately, the
courts, restrained by principles of common law formulated to solve
different problems, have found it difficult, and sometimes impossi-
ble, to achieve a workable balance. The Kentucky Court of Ap-
275 647 P.2d 1127 (Arz. 1982). See text accompanying notes 7-15 supra.
276 See text accompanying notes 95-129 supra.
M See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
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peals in Feathers tipped the balance in favor of the first objec-
tive, recognizing a new tort and allowing recovery of extensive
consequential and punitive damages. 278 The court abandoned
any accommodation of the second policy interest. Because of the
failure of the common law to provide an effective resolution, a
legislative solution is appropriate. The legislative forum can pro-
vide for the consideration and debate of all viewpoints, resulting
in a proper balance.
The authors propose a statute that provides for a monetary
penalty to be imposed on the insurer when the factfinder deter-
mines that it acted in bad faith.279 Such a penalty will deter acts
of bad faith. Legislation incorporating a penalty provision for bad
faith need not be complicated. A penalty would only be imposed
after finding that the insurer acted in bad faith. The standard for
bad faith would be defined by the statute and should be similar
to a negligence or perhaps gross negligence standard. The statute,
like the LeMaster bill, should label certain conduct as unfair claims
settlement practices. It should also include a residual power allow-
ing the courts to reach cases of bad faith falling outside the specific
enumeration.
In essence, the legislation should provide that a first party in-
surer who, with negligence or recklessness, fails to pay or delays
payment of a claim that is not otherwise fairly debatable, has acted
in bad faith toward its insured. Such a finding would automatically
trigger the penalty provision, forcing the insurer to pay a percen-
tage of the judgment to the insured as a penalty The penalty is
designed to deter insurers from challenging claims other than those
that are at least-fairly debatable. The authors suggest 20 % as an
appropriate measure. This statute must contain two provisions to
ensure its effectiveness. First, the prevailing insured should be
allowed to recover reasonable attorney's fees for successful pro-
secution of as first party claim, regardless of the insurer's bad faith.
This provision accomplishes several objectives. By recovering those
fees, the insured is guaranteed the benefit of his bargain, rather
than having his award substantially reduced by the cost of
278 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR, slip op. at 8
(Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1982).
279 See Appendix infra.
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establishing his right to payment under the policy. Further, the
insurer is prevented from using the prospect of protracted and cost-
ly litigation as leverage for exacting a settlement of the claim below
the amount due under the policy. The insurer is encouraged to
exercise caution before denying a claim in light of the prospect
that he may eventually subsidize the insured's litigation as well.
The statute must also contain an exclusivity provision to en-
sure that it provides the sole remedy in first party cases. This pro-
vision protects insurers from unrestricted tort recoveries by mak-
ing clear that the legislation is intended to preempt the field. This
provision is necessary because some courts have used unfair claims
legislation as a springboard for allowing tort damages, thereby
eviscerating the intent and effectiveness of the legislation.21(
Once litigation is commenced by the insured to recover under
the contract, the statute should contain a mechanism to facilitate
prompt settlement of the claim. For example, the dispute may con-
cern a difference of opinion with respect to the amount to which
the insured is entitled rather than whether coverage is afforded
for the loss. The authors propose a mechanism that allows the in-
surer to mitigate his potential loss by allowing it to submit a written
offer of settlement to the insured for an amount it believes the
insured is entitled to recover. If the insured rejects that offer and
the insurer is ultimately adjudged and entitled to recover an
amount equal to or less than the offer of settlement, the insured
should not be allowed to recover attorney fees incurred from the
time the offer of settlement was first communicated to him.
Finally, this solution requires special findings from the fact-
finder. Initially, the factfinder must determine if the insurer is
liable under the policy If so, a determination of the bad faith
issue would follow. If an insured succeeds on both issues, judg-
ment must be entered for the amount due under the policy as con-
tract damages, 20 % of this amount as penalty, and a reasonable
attorney's fee. Of course, interest and costs would be awarded as
in any contract case.
Additional avenues of common law recovery may be available
to insureds injured by truly egregious conduct. Particularly
reprehensible practices may violate a duty independent from the
280 See notes 257-62 & 270-74 and accompanying text supra.
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contract, giving rise to a separate action in tort. For example, under
appropriate circumstances, an insurer and its agent might be guilty
of common law fraud for actions taken during the course of a
claim. If so, the statute would not preclude recovery. The recent
case of Craft v. Rice"' provides an additional theory of recovery
in tort that may prove useful in cases of flagrant misconduct. In
Craft, the Kentucky Court of Appeals recognized the tort of
outrage as defined by the Restatement (Second) of Torts which
describes the tort as follows: "(1) One who by extreme and out-
rageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress,
and if bodily harm to the other results from it for such bodily
harm."21s2 The court recognized that a duty exists to refrain from
recklessly or intentionally causing severe emotional distress to
another. a This duty exists in the-bad faith context independent
of the contract.
The tort of outrage provides a safety net for those suffering
severe but intangible injury by the outrageous conduct of insurance
companies or their representatives. The Kentucky courts should
adhere, without deviation, to the rigorous Restatement standard
of culpability because the tort of outrage can be a slippery slope.
Deviation from the strict standard threatens to impose a type of
strict liability on insurers, a result that should be avoided. How-
ever, if the Restatement position is followed, the tort of outrage
can be a useful tool in deterring bad faith.
Of the available common law and legislative alternatives, the
statutory penalty scheme yields the best balance of the competing
policy objectives. The penalty and award of attorney's fees forces
insurers to evaluate claims early in the settlement process and deters
them from unreasonably withholding payment of valid claims.
At the same time, insurers will not be discouraged from question-
ing claims which are fairly debatable, because no penalty results
for defense in good faith. Although insurance compames are always
subject to some degree of jury prejudice, the risks of multi-million
dollar punitive damage awards are eliminated. The remedial
81 30 KLS 6, at 2 (slip op. Aug. 22, 1983).
282 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
283 30 KLS 6, at 2-3.
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legislation avoids the conceptual problems inherent in the com-
mon law solutions. Most importantly, the legislature can shape
the statute to achieve the most socially and economically desirable
accommodation of competing public policies. While the penalty
provision might provide excessive or inadequate compensation,
according to the particular case, it must be remembered that deter-
rence, rather than compensation, is its primary goal. The insured
is compensated by recovery under the contract, and receipt of at-
torney's fees. Although the inherent tension between the policy
objectives may make a perfect solution impossible, this statutory
approach presents a workable solution that should be considered
by the General Assembly.
CONCLUSION
A timeworn maxim states that bad facts often make bad law.
Many courts have adopted the tort theory in the context of gross
overreaching by the insurer and catastrophic injury to the insured.
This Article has discussed the problems caused by the conclusion
that an insurer commits a tort when it breaches an insurance con-
tract. The compelling facts of an insured's plight do not warrant
an abandonment of fundamental principles of contract and tort
law. The Feathers2s4 court usurped the prerogative of the
General Assembly to make the difficult choices inherent in this
issue and ignored the admonishment of Chief Justice Struckmeyer
of the Arizona Supreme Court when that body recognized the tort
theory:
Plainly, the Legislature is not unaware of bad faith motives in
breaching a contract and has provided a remedy by which a party
may recover his expenses if compelled to litigate. A change in
the law which the majority impatiently press forward to make
should more properly emanate from the Legislature, where a
thorough assessment of necessity and the social and economic
implications may be considered.2
284 Feathers v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., No. 83-CA-158-MR slip op. at 7-8
(Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1983).
285 Noble v National Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 871 (Ariz.
1981)(Struckmeyer, C.J., dissenting).
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Prior to Feathers, the insurance industry in this state had been
relatively unchecked by statutory or common law constraints on
the quality of its conduct in settling claims with insureds. Clear-
ly, the court of appeals in Feathers sought to change this situa-
tion. Because the various common law solutions are not adequately
equipped to resolve the competing policy objectives presented by
this issue, the legislature should adopt a statute designed to ad-
dress the concerns of both the insurer and the insured.
APPENDIX
AN ACT relating to first party insurance claims.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky:
SECTION 1. A NEW SECTION OF SUBTITLE - OF KRS
CHAPTER 304 IS CREATED TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The desire to provide a fair and equitable means of resolv-
ing disputes that arise between insurers and insureds requires that
the statutory mechanism herein be adopted to effect the follow-
ing purposes:
(a) To encourage insurers to conduct reasonable investigations
of claims by its insureds;
(b) To promote prompt, fair and equitable settlements of
claims in which liability has become reasonably clear;
(c) To deter insurers from unreasonably delaying or denying
benefits due their insureds under contracts of insurance;
(d) To provide the insured the benefit of his bargain when
he is compelled to bring a cause of action against his insurer to
enforce the terms of a valid insurance contract;
(e) To provide a reasonable remedy for common law causes
of action by first party claimants; and
(f) To allow insurers to assert valid defenses and to defend
fairly debatable claims without exposure to liability grossly
disproportionate to the claims and amounts involved.
(2) Under no circumstances is it the intent nor shall this sub-
title be construed to provide the basis for an independent duty,
which the breach thereof would give rise to an independent tort.
(3) As used in this subtitle the following definitions shall apply:
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(a) "First party claimant" means an individual, corporation,
association, partnership or other legal entity asserting a right to
payment under an insurance policy or insurance contract arising
out of the occurrence of the contingency or loss covered by such
policy or contract. A "first party claimant" includes, but is not
limited to, the intended beneficiary of an uninsured motorist in-
surance policy.
(b) An "insurance policy or contract" means a policy or con-
tract entered into by an insurer as defined in this Chapter or a
substitute therefore entered into by a self-insured entity or
employer.
(c) "Bad faith" means there must be an absence of a reasonable
basis of denial of the insurance policy or contract benefits. The
insurer's refusal to pay a fairly debatable claim does not contstitute
bad faith for purposes of this subtitle.
(4) If a first party claimant is adjudged to have been entitled
to recovery according to the terms of the insurance contract under
which a right of recovery is claimed in an amount in excess of that
amount offered by the issuer of the insurance policy or contract,
the court shall award the first party claimant a reasonable attorney
fee.
(5) Should the issuer of the insurance policy or contract make
a written offer of settlement to the first party claimant in an
amount that is equal to or more than that which the first party
claimant is ultimately adjudged to be entitled to recover, the first
party claimant shall not recover attorneys fees incurred from the
time the offer of settlement was communicated to the first party
claimant. After litigation has commenced, the settlement offer shall
be in the form contemplated and governed by the terms of Ken-
tucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
(6) Upon being adjudged liable to the first party claimant,
the issuer of the insurance policy or contract shall pay an addi-
tional penalty not to exceed twenty percent (20 %) of the recovery
to the extent it exceeds any amount offered in accordance with
sub-section five (5) hereof if the court or jury finds that such defen-
dant's refusal to pay the first party claimant according to the terms
of he insurance policy or contract was in bad faith. But in no case
shall such penalty be less thasn five hundred dollars ($500).
(7) The penalty imposed under this subtitle shall be the ex-
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elusive remedy for the refusal of the issuer of the insurance policy
or contract to pay a first party claimant in the absence of good
faith and such failure shall not give rise to an independent action
in tort.
ADDENDUM
At the time of printing, the legislative proposal by the authors
had been introduced before the 1984 Kentucky General Assembly
as House Bills 761 and 794 and Senate Bill 334.
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